

# CURRENT *History*

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE  
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

ONE NIGHT ONLY

MAY 1963

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FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

# CURRENT *History*

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June, 1963

### GOVERNMENT AND MEDICINE ABROAD

In the summer of 1963, CURRENT HISTORY will devote three issues to a study of the role of government in providing medical care for its citizens. The June issue, first in the series, focuses on the way other countries have met the medical needs of their peoples.

### Government Responsibility for Public Health

by DR. W. HORSLEY GANTT, Emeritus Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the Pavlovian Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University;

### Medical Care in West Germany

by ARNOLD PRICE, Library of Congress;

### Medical Care in Canada

by DR. JOHN E. F. HASTINGS, Associate Professor of Public Health, University of Toronto;

### Medical Care in Sweden

by JOHN WUORINEN, Professor of History, Columbia University;

### Medical Care in India

by DR. PRABHA MALHOTRA, Reader in Preventive and Social Medicine at the Maulana Azad Medical College, New Delhi, India;

### Medical Care in France

by HENRY GALANT, Professor of Government, Skidmore College;

### Medical Care in the U.S.S.R.

by ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.

#### Also Coming . . .

GOVERNMENT AND MEDICINE IN GREAT BRITAIN,  
July, 1963

GOVERNMENT AND MEDICINE IN THE UNITED  
STATES, August, 1963

**HIGH SCHOOL DEBATERS:** Note these 3 issues on the 1963-64 N.U.E.A. DEBATE TOPIC.

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# CURRENT History

MAY, 1963

VOL. 44, NO. 261

*Our May issue is devoted to a study of East Europe and its stability as a power bloc. Seven specialists analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the satellite nations. The first article examines Poland's internal development and its relations with the Soviet Union. "The current regime in Warsaw seized power with the aid of the Red Army and continues to be dependent upon the U.S.S.R. for its very existence. . . . Even today Gomulka's position itself would be endangered if Soviet power declined or retreated. It is primarily for this reason, and also due to Communist ideological solidarity, that the foreign relations of the Warsaw regime are based almost exclusively upon Soviet policy."*

## Profile of Poland

By RICHARD STAAR

*Professor of Political Science, Emory University*

COMMUNIST CONTROL over Poland in 1963 is virtually absolute but not yet fully open and acknowledged, because the historically conditioned attitudes of the people still influence the tempo at which the program can be implemented. Although three officially recognized political groups still exist, two of these are puppets of the third—the Polish United Workers' (Communist) party—whose openly proclaimed goal is the transformation of the current people's democracy into a socialist state patterned after the U.S.S.R. Article 14 of the constitution,<sup>1</sup> for example, promises an ever greater fulfillment of the Soviet principle under socialism: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

<sup>1</sup> *Dziennik Ustaw* [Journal of Laws], No. 33 (July 23, 1952).

<sup>2</sup> This explanation was given for the Poznan riots by *Trybuna Ludu* [People's Tribune], Warsaw (June 30, 1956).

Manipulation of the electoral process, an alert police system and total control over the mass communications media are being used to create an outward impression of popular support and to represent any manifestation of discontent or opposition as resulting from the activities of hostile capitalist agents.<sup>2</sup> Overt resistance essentially has become impossible and, barring war or withdrawal of U.S.S.R. support, the present type of regime appears stable and destined to endure indefinitely. In foreign affairs, the Warsaw government remains a faithful member of the Soviet bloc and a loyal supporter of international Communist diplomacy.

Agrarian reform, even before the end of the war, expropriated about seven million hectares (1 hectare = 2.471 acres) of land. Some land was distributed to peasants with farms too small for subsistence or to landless agricultural workers, a measure that enjoyed

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**TABLE 1**  
**POLISH GRAIN IMPORTS, 1950-1963\***  
(in millions of tons)

Number of years	Dates	Average per year	Total
6	1950-1955	0.60	4.00
5	1956-1960	1.60	8.00
2	1961-1962	2.50	5.00
1	1963 (est.)	2.85	2.85
14 years		1.41 tons (overall 14 year average)	19.85 tons

\* Sources compiled from *Trybuna Ludu* (August 24, 1962); *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Economic Life), Warsaw (November 18, 1962); and *Radio Warsaw* (November 26, 1962).

great popularity. The rest was transferred to the newly established State Farms which have been subsidized ever since.<sup>3</sup> The gentry, with fewer than 40,000 land estates before World War II, disappeared as a social class.

Collectivization was at first specifically denied as an aim of the regime. Wladyslaw Gomulka, who was then secretary-general of the Communist party and first deputy premier, stated: "We have totally rejected the collectivization of farms."<sup>4</sup> Less than two years later, this policy was reversed. Between 1949 and 1956, the number of so-called production cooperatives, the euphemism for collective farms, increased from 243 to over 10,600 units with 220,000 families and two million hectares or 8.6 per cent of the land. The target for 1960 was 30 per cent.<sup>5</sup>

In the meanwhile Gomulka returned to power after an eight-year absence. In a

speech, he disclosed that private farms were much more productive than collectives and gave figures to support this. The collectivized peasants themselves were allowed to "decide the matter of dissolving" their farms, if they operated at a loss to the economy.<sup>6</sup> Almost 85 per cent of the production cooperatives disappeared by 1957, and even today there exist fewer than 2,000 units which encompass only 0.4 per cent of all farmsteads.<sup>7</sup>

The regime in Warsaw has not given up its attempt to inculcate the collectivist attitude among peasants, despite the latter's distrust. The new approach has been through the agricultural circles of which there are now some 27,000 with more than one million members.<sup>8</sup> Pressure is being exerted on the individual farmer to join these organizations, through the state-controlled apparatus for agricultural supply and sales which favors the circles in contrast to the unaffiliated individual. In April, 1962, taxes on private farms were increased by 19 per cent. State contracts with peasants for delivery of grain and livestock are also being manipulated with political goals in mind. Such policies have undermined incentive and necessitate large imports of grain.<sup>9</sup> See Table 1.

On other fronts, also, the several years after the war in Poland can be compared with the New Economic Policy period (1921-1928) during the formative stage of the Soviet system. They were characterized by considerable latitude for private trade, handicrafts and light industry as well as agricul-

<sup>3</sup> *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 1 (August 15, 1944). See also proceedings of the twelfth plenum in *The New York Times*, Western Edition (March 2, 1963).

<sup>4</sup> *Nowe Drogi* [New Paths], I (January-February, 1947), p. 12.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, X (May, 1956), p. 19.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* (October, 1956), p. 24.

<sup>7</sup> *Polityka* [Politics], No. 10 (1963), as quoted by *Informacyjny Biuletyn Tygodniowy* [Weekly Information Bulletin], X, No. 3 (January 23, 1963), p. 1; hence forth cited as *I.B.T.*

<sup>8</sup> *Slowo Powszechne* [Universal Word], Warsaw (January 18, 1963).

<sup>9</sup> During 1962, "over two million tons less of grain, some 7.6 million tons fewer potatoes, over 1.3 million tons' decrease in sugar beets" were grown according to Gomulka's speech over *Radio Warsaw* (November 26, 1962).



ture. The regime, in a series of official statements promising to protect the "private sector" in the economy, encouraged the population to believe that these conditions would be maintained.

### THE SIX YEAR PLAN

However, the adoption of the Six-Year-Plan<sup>10</sup> formalized a turning point in postwar developments. It proclaimed the objective of laying the foundations of socialism. Bolesław Bierut, premier and Communist party chairman at that time, indicated the uncompromising nature of the newly fused political and economic policy as follows:<sup>11</sup>

[People's democracy is not] a synthesis of a permanent coexistence between two differing social systems but a system which pushes out and gradually liquidates capitalistic elements and simultaneously develops and strengthens the foundations of the future socialist economy.

The main step in this direction had been taken in 1946 when a law<sup>12</sup> was passed confiscating and nationalizing some 3,300 mills, plants, mines and factories with more than 50 workers per shift, i.e., the basic enterprises in the national economy. This measure was similar to the "seizure of the commanding heights" by the Bolsheviks soon after the Russian revolution. During the Six-Year-Plan (1950–1955), smaller industrial producers and businessmen were likewise gradually eliminated by such means as prohibitive taxation and difficulties in obtaining raw materials.

The monetary policies pursued by the Communists in Poland also followed familiar Soviet patterns. The cure adopted for in-

flation was a cut in the large supply of money rather than increased production of consumers' goods. Large private holdings of the monetary unit, the *zloty*, were twice confiscated within a period of five years.<sup>13</sup> Both these changes and the tax policy were designed to fall hardest on the groups not in political favor, the *kulaks* (peasants who hired farm hands), merchants, and the remaining private entrepreneurs.

Banks were nationalized in January, 1946, at the same time that large industry was taken over by the regime. All pre-existing obligations of the former Polish government were declared void, although in 1960 a reparations agreement<sup>14</sup> was finally signed with the United States to provide \$40 million over a period of 30 years as token compensation for confiscated private American property. An ever-increasing part of the national income began to pass through the state budget. The budget in turn was used to direct resources into heavy industry and away from the production of consumers' goods.

### JUNE AND OCTOBER, 1956

Exploitation and repression of all classes gradually increased until the events at the city of Poznan. Here, an orderly march of strikers demanding bread and more freedom changed into street fighting on June 28–29 1956, when factory workers were fired upon by security police. The official figures, possibly underestimated, listed 38 persons killed and 270 wounded. At first, the Warsaw regime blamed foreign agent-provocateurs but later admitted<sup>15</sup> that the cause was economic.

Poznan paved the way for Gomulka's return to power in October. No parallel should be drawn with Hungary, however, where an uprising started during the same month. In Poland, what occurred was only a change in the Communist leadership. Gomulka announced a ban on force in collectivizing, a slow-down from the rapid rate of development in heavy industry, and the restoration of "socialist legality" as well as intra-Party democracy. He promised higher living

<sup>10</sup> *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 37 (August 30, 1950).

<sup>11</sup> Quoted by P. I. Glushakov (ed.), *Pyat let narodnoi Polshi* [Five Years of People's Poland], Moscow, 1951, p. 91.

<sup>12</sup> *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 3 (February 5, 1946).

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 1 (January 6, 1945); No. 50 (October 29, 1950).

<sup>14</sup> *Radio Warsaw* (July 16, 1960). The first payment of \$2 million was made two and one-half years later. *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (January 12, 1963).

<sup>15</sup> *Trybuna Ludu* (July 6, 1956). This event and the change in leadership are covered in *Current History*, XXXVI, No. 212 (April, 1959), pp. 207–208.

standards, more personal freedom, and greater independence from the Soviet Union.<sup>16</sup> This apparently sufficed to avert more riots or demonstrations.

However, the hopes that the population nurtured after 1956 have since been crushed. All claims by industrial workers, who had been promised wage increases estimated as \$2.5 billion at the official rate of exchange and approved through legislation, were cancelled by a simple parliamentary resolution.<sup>17</sup> Difficult material conditions have contributed to widespread alcoholism, the consumption per capita more than tripling since before the war. The new draft penal code copies the U.S.S.R. model and extends the death penalty to include manslaughter, serious economic offenses, theft of state property, "crimes against peace and humanity," and grave offenses against the state like terrorism, sabotage, and espionage.<sup>18</sup>

In the area of social policy, too, the Communist regime is pursuing its basic aim of patterning Polish society after the U.S.S.R. prototype. The groups officially favored by regime activities consist of workers in heavy industry and miners who received preferential food allotments until 1953 when rationing was abolished. Although the claim was made that the pre-war standard of living had been attained by 1949, (later disclosed by Gomulka to have been false), there is no mention in the current Five-Year-Plan (1961-1965) of any emphasis on housing or consumers' goods.

One of the standard groups in society on which Communist propaganda concentrates its efforts comprises women. Avowed regime

policy has been to equalize their status by law. The reason for this is to attract as many women as possible into industry, to attain the same level as in the U.S.S.R. where about half of the labor force is female. In Poland, it is about 34 per cent. Usually, women end up in the lower paying, i.e., unskilled, fields of employment.<sup>19</sup> Perhaps a more convincing inducement than official propaganda for the increase in female recruitment has been the low wage scale which more often than not prevents the husband from earning enough to support his family.

## FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The current regime in Warsaw seized power with the aid of the Red Army and continues to be dependent upon the U.S.S.R. for its very existence. The rulers in Poland certainly realize that their predecessors were also maintained by Soviet support and that even today Gomulka's position itself would be endangered if Soviet power declined or retreated. It is primarily for this reason, and also due to Communist ideological solidarity, that the foreign relations of the Warsaw regime are based almost exclusively upon Soviet policy.

Neither organized groups nor public opinion in general have any direct influence on Polish foreign affairs. The two subordinate political parties have no independence, being controlled by known crypto-Communists. The ruling Party is not dependent upon popular support either and can, therefore, disregard public opinion within certain limits. If a truly free election could be held, the Communists most certainly would be voted out of office.

The avowed foreign policies of the Communists in Poland can be said to consist of collaboration with the Soviet bloc (see Table 2), the maintenance of present borders along the Oder and Neisse rivers in the West, and weakening the influence of the United States, which means by and large isolating the great majority of the Polish population from personal contacts with the West. An official government handbook emphasizes the close relationship with the Communist sphere.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>16</sup> *Nowe Drogi*, X (October, 1956), pp. 3-46 carries Gomulka's entire speech.

<sup>17</sup> *Trybuna Ludu* (March 22, 1957).

<sup>18</sup> *Prawo i Życie* [Law and Life], Warsaw (March 20, 1960) re alcoholism; *ibid.*, (January 20, 1963) re penal code.

<sup>19</sup> *Polish Perspectives*, V, No. 11 (November, 1962), pp. 12-20. Due to difficult conditions, the population increase has dropped from 19.5 in 1955 to 12.4 per thousand in 1962. *Biuletyn Statystyczny* No. 12 (1962), as cited by *IBT*, X, No. 4 (February 7, 1963), p. 3.

<sup>20</sup> *Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy* [Political and Economic Yearbook], Warsaw, 1962, p. 1083. See also the Gomulka interview in the *London Times* (February 4, 1963).

**TABLE 2**  
**POLAND'S FOREIGN TRADE,**  
**1960 and 1965 (est.)\***  
 (in percentages)

<i>Geographic Area</i>	<i>1960</i>	<i>1965</i>
Socialist countries**	62.6	64.9
Developed capitalist countries	29.8	22.0
Economically less developed countries	7.6	13.1
Totals.	100.0	100.0

\* Source: Moscow, *International Affairs*, IX, No. 1 (January, 1963), p. 70.

\*\* Note: Between 1950 and 1960, annual trade turnover in Eastern Europe increased from \$1.9 to \$6.7 billion in value. Poland's foreign trade with the U.S.S.R. alone during 1962 amounted to 1.11 billion rubles or an increase of 18 per cent over 1961, according to the Moscow magazine *Foreign Trade*, No. 1 (January, 1963). The official rate of exchange is \$1.11 = one ruble.

Perhaps the best example of support for U.S.S.R. policy has been the so-called Rapacki Plan. It suggests the establishment of a denuclearized zone in central Europe to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, where "nuclear weapons would neither be manufactured nor stock-piled . . . and the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be forbidden."<sup>21</sup> The aim of this plan obviously consists of preventing the Bonn government from obtaining any atomic arms as part of the Nato defense system.<sup>22</sup> It has been rejected repeatedly by the United States.<sup>23</sup>

Despite bitter attacks on the United States<sup>24</sup>, Poland has continued to receive aid from the United States which totalled over half a billion dollars in value between

1957 and 1963. See Table 3. The largest of these United States-Polish agreements involved the shipment of 1.5 million tons of wheat, barley, corn, sorghum, vegetable oils, and cotton in addition to other goods. This program has represented considerable assistance to an unfavorable balance of trade, since the Polish deficit from 1958 through mid-1962 was half a billion dollars, with imports of grain alone predicted for 1963 to reach almost three million tons.<sup>25</sup> This American policy of helping the Warsaw regime surmount its economic difficulties "has not led to a more liberal evolution in Poland which could have been expected,"<sup>26</sup> according to the former United States Ambassador at Warsaw, Jacob D. Beam. In contrast to the regime, the attitude of the population toward the United States cannot be gauged precisely.

### THE RULING PARTY

The formal pattern of political life in post-war Poland has been extremely simple compared with the pre-1939 period. Always in opposition to the Polish government before the Second World War and with no support to speak of among the population, the Communists found themselves with a monopoly of power in 1944, thanks to the Red Army. At first, despite this control over the government, six political parties were allowed to exist for a few years. By 1950, however, the total was reduced to three with the Polish United Workers' party (P.Z.P.R. *Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*) as the acknowledged leader.<sup>27</sup>

A small group of 11 men, the Political Bureau, currently determines the Party line and hence the policy and organization of the government. The Politburo's dominance over the state structure can be appreciated from the fact that the most important posts in the government are monopolized by members of that organ. Party discipline and control over the repressive powers of the state constitute the principal means for maintaining this authority. Since the discipline is indeed rigorous, the Politburo's directives are obeyed by key officials on all levels.

<sup>21</sup> *Radio Warsaw* (February 17, 1958). Note too Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki's article in the London *International Affairs*, XXXIX, No. 1 (January, 1963), pp. 1-12, 36, 168.

<sup>22</sup> *Radio Warsaw* (September 10, 1962).

<sup>23</sup> A recent rejection came at Geneva, where Arthur H. Dean turned down the plan as proposed by Polish delegate Manfred Lachs. *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (December 22, 1962).

<sup>24</sup> *Trybuna Ludu* (March 4, 1962).

<sup>25</sup> *Radio Warsaw* (November 26, 1962) speech by Gomulka; *Sztandar Mlodych* [Banner of Youth], Warsaw (January 7, 1963).

<sup>26</sup> *The New York Times* (March 4, 1962).

<sup>27</sup> At the end of the war, the Communists claimed 20,000 members. Early in 1963, the P.Z.P.R. numbered about 1.3 million. *IBT*, X, No. 2 (January 16, 1963), p. 1.

**TABLE 3**  
**SOVIET AND U.S. CREDITS TO POLAND, 1947-1963\***  
(in millions of dollars)

<i>Soviet Union</i>		<i>United States</i>	
Dates	Amounts	Dates	Amounts
March 5, 1947	\$ 28.0	June 7 & August 14, 1957	\$ 95.0
January 26, 1948	450.0	February 15, 1958	98.0
July 2, 1950	100.0	June 10 & November 10, 1959;	
September 24, 1956	25.0	February 11, 1960	103.3
November 18, 1956	175.0	July 21, 1960	130.0
same (grain only)	100.0	December 15, 1961	44.6
	\$ 878.0	April 19, 1962	15.8
		February 1, 1963	51.6
			\$ 538.3

\* Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, as cited in the *Congressional Record*, CIII (August 27, 1957), p. 14617; *Radio Warsaw* (September 20, 1960); *The New York Times* (December 16, 1961); Department of State, Press Release, No. 260 (April 19, 1962); and *Zycie Warszawy* (February 5, 1963).

With the exception of the two former Socialists (Cyrankiewicz and Rapacki), who joined the P.Z.P.R. at the fusion congress of 1948, the other nine veteran Communists have been members of the movement on an average of 34 years, i.e., since each was the age of 20. These nine were all jailed from one to seven years prior to the war for subversive activities. Eight were in the U.S.S.R. or on Soviet-controlled territory part or all of the time between 1939 and 1944, the remaining one (Loga-Sowinski) having stayed inside Poland.

As Party leader, Gomulka's position since 1956 has been one of exceptional, if ostensibly only nominal authority. His is the apparent power of final decision, subject to Soviet "advice" on certain matters, over all important Party and state affairs. From the very beginning of his career as a professional revolutionary at age 17, Gomulka displayed the traits of an excellent apparatus worker. Although jailed in Poland before and after, Gomulka studied from 1934 to 1936 at the International Lenin School in Moscow.<sup>28</sup> This fact remains generally unknown.

<sup>28</sup> *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopedia* [large Soviet Encyclopedia], Moscow, 1958 (2nd ed.), LI, p. 84.

<sup>29</sup> See the *New Leader*, XLII, No. 47 (December 21, 1959), pp. 12-14.

<sup>30</sup> Jerzy Ptakowski in *East Europe*, XI, No. 12 (December, 1962), pp. 18-25, gives an excellent analysis and provides names.

After two years at Soviet-occupied Lwow in southeastern Poland, he spent the rest of the war in the Communist underground and finally was elected Party leader.

Gomulka was removed from that post in September, 1948, arrested in July, 1950, for "nationalist deviation" but never tried, and was finally released four years later. His Party membership was restored in August, 1956, just two months before he came back to power. After three years in office, Gomulka reorganized the government with the appointment of six veteran activists,<sup>29</sup> who in their former posts had played important roles under the Stalinist regime of Bierut. They disappeared from the public eye after October, 1956, and their return soon brought a tightening of policy in such areas as education, agriculture, planning, and security.

More recently, there seems to be emerging a new power group within the P.Z.P.R. Central Committee whose members all served with the very few Communist guerrilla units which were active against the Germans during the war and collaborated with Soviet partisans on Polish territory.<sup>30</sup> Although none has as yet attained Politburo status, the group reportedly has the support of both Zambrowski and Zawadzki, who spent the entire period 1939-1944 in Soviet-controlled areas and in the U.S.S.R. proper.

The only other groups in Poland today



TABLE 4  
POLITICAL BUREAU, 1963\*

Name	Born	Social class	C. P. Mbr.	Spent W. W. II	Politburo Mbr.** (dates)	Current Post
Gomulka, Wladyslaw	1905	prol.	1926	USSR/Pol.	July '44–Sept '48; Oct '56–	I Secr. PZPR
Zawadzki, Aleksander	1899	prol.	1922	USSR	July '44–	Chmn. State Council
Spychalski, Marian	1906	prol.	1926	Pol./USSR	Aug '44–Nov '49; Mar '59–	Defense Minister
Zambrowski, Roman	1909	midl.	1924	USSR	Aug '44–	Secr. PZPR
Ochab, Edward	1906	midl.	1929	USSR	Nov '48–	Secr. PZPR
Cyrankiewicz, Jozef	1911	midl.	1948	Pol./Germ.	Dec. '48–	Premier
Rapacki, Adam	1909	midl.	1948	Poland	Dec '48–	Foreign Minister
Jedrychowski, Stefan	1910	midl.	1932	USSR	July '56–	Chmn. Plan. Comm.
Gierek, Edward	1913	prol.	1931	Belgium	Jly–Oct '56; Mar '59–	Secr. PZPR
Loga-Sowinski, Ignacy	1914	prol.	1932	Poland	Oct '56–	Chmn. Trade Unions
Kliszko, Zenon	1908	prol.	1933	USSR/Pol.	Mar '59–	Secr. PZPR

\* Sources: Biographic data from *Trybuna Ludu* for December 21, 1956; December 24, 1956; March 13, 1959; December 23, 1957; December 22, 1956; January 15, 1957; January 4, 1957; December 29, 1956; July 29, 1956; February 27, 1957; and February 21, 1957, respectively.

\*\* Note: The July and August 1944 dates for election to the Politburo, when that body was first established, come from Marian Malinowski (ed.), *Polska Partia Robotnicza: Kronika* [Polish Workers' Party: Chronicle], Warsaw, 1962, p. 23.

which can be characterized as even quasi-political are the youth organizations. They embrace boys and girls from the ages of seven, beginning with the Braves (7 to 11), through the Union of Polish Pioneers (11 to 18), and ending with the Rural Youth (16 to 21) and Socialist Youth (15 to 28) unions. The last organization has units also in the armed forces and in the universities but embraces only ten per cent of eligible youth. All these groups are openly admitted to be auxiliaries of the P.Z.P.R. and assist the latter in its political work.

In addition to the above, there also exists a Polish Students' Union founded in 1950 and incorporating almost 70 per cent of all university youth, currently about 95,000. Its chairman, Czeslaw Wisniewski, has commented on the group's tasks as follows:<sup>31</sup>

<sup>31</sup> *Nowe Drogi*, XIV (October, 1960) p. 153. Figures on students come from *IBT*, X, No. 5 (February 14, 1963), p. 3.

<sup>32</sup> For details, see *Nowa Kultura* [New Culture] Warsaw (February 12, 1961). An intensification of political indoctrination was forecast at the 11th Central Committee plenum. *Radio Warsaw* (December 17, 1962).

We can sum up the entire line of the program with the slogan, "active work of the Polish Students' Union for the purpose of bringing studies closer to life and to current problems of the country." The most valuable are those programs which accentuate matters of social importance.

Of course, this man was thinking of political theory and the fact that all universities resumed 60 hours of compulsory lectures in Marxist philosophy and social development just one month before his article appeared.<sup>32</sup> These had been dropped from the curriculum in October of 1956. There also seem to be enough teachers of Russian, which is mandatory beginning with the fifth grade and continues through high school as well as on into the university.

This program of political indoctrination is expected to undermine the strong attachment to religion on the part of the great majority of university students. The regime itself admits the powerful attraction maintained primarily by the Roman Catholic Church. The results of a poll, conducted by the Socio-

logical Institute at Warsaw University<sup>33</sup> among the student body, indicated that 69 per cent proclaim themselves as believers, with the ratio for women some 12 per cent higher than for men.<sup>33</sup> The same source reported that a study by *Polish Radio* showed that 78.3 per cent of high school and university youth stated they attended church regularly.

One of the most serious problems for the Communists today is what to do with the tremendous number of young people not registered in any of the regime-controlled groups. This is compounded by the fact that a considerable percentage of youngsters in the 14 through 17 age span leave primary school and do not continue on the secondary level. It would not present any issue, if this group worked. However, recent statistics disclose that some 890,000 boys and girls in the above category neither study nor work. By 1965, this figure will border on a million.<sup>34</sup>

The regime's objective has never been merely separation of church and state but a complete elimination of religion from the lives of the people. Achievement of this aim requires isolation from Vatican influence, creation of public opinion antagonistic toward the universalism of the Church, and a schism among the clergy, replacing bona fide leaders with persons willing to compromise.

The position of the Catholic Church in Poland today is a paradox. Never in modern times has its hold been so strong, yet never has its position been so precarious. It is the religion of almost all Poles in the statistical sense,<sup>35</sup> and crowded churches testify to the continued vitality of the Catholic faith.

In spite of this unwavering popular support

<sup>33</sup> *Express Wieczorny* [Evening Express] Warsaw (February 25-26, 1961). See also Jean Malara in *Est & Ouest*, XV, No. 292 (January 16-31, 1963), pp. 6-10.

<sup>34</sup> *Kierunki* [Directions], Warsaw (August 28, 1960).

<sup>35</sup> Only some 800,000 out of 30 million comprise members of denominations other than the Roman Catholic. *Argumenty* [Arguments], Warsaw, No. 33 (1962), as cited by *IBT*, IX, No. 37 (September 20, 1962), p. 3.

<sup>36</sup> *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 9 (March 23, 1950) and No. 10 (February 10, 1953). Note also the article on teaching atheism in *Przegląd Kulturalny* [Cultural Review], Warsaw (September 13, 1962.)

<sup>37</sup> *Nowa Kultura* (April 28, 1962).

the Church is engaged in a struggle for its very existence. This is above all a struggle for the minds of the youth. Here the Church is most vulnerable. Government legislation<sup>36</sup> affecting the organization itself also has been extensive and has resulted in the loss of much landed property, severe limitations on charitable activities, as well as a veto on appointments in the hierarchy.

The Communists obviously would prefer to achieve their aims through intimidation and pressure rather than by the use of force. Admittedly 13,500 lay priests, about 8,000 monks, 30,000 nuns, 8,000 graduates or students at diocesan seminaries<sup>37</sup> represent various attitudes toward the Warsaw government, anywhere from bitterly hostile to the small group of former collaborators who made up the so-called patriot priest movement. However, these 60,000 individuals because of their tremendous influence in Poland include the only organized potential threat to absolute Communist control over the population. Hence, they will continue to be the target of attempts to eliminate them or convert them into pliable tools of the regime.

Poland in May, 1963, was in the third stage of its development toward socialism, U.S.S.R. style. The Soviet pattern has been demonstrated perhaps most tangibly by the adoption of a Stalin-type constitution. Apart from acting as a mouthpiece for the Soviets in world organizations, the Warsaw Communists probably exercise some independence in Bloc relations. Although the Polish regime continues to accept economic help from the United States, Communist leaders attack American policy at times even more vitriolically than do their Russian mentors. In the field of foreign affairs, Poland can hardly claim a policy of its own.

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*"The status of Eastern Germany today is that of a completely sovietized satellite. The political and economic systems, education and culture, youth and the family, have been molded, outwardly at least, according to the Soviet pattern. Politically, economically and militarily, East Germany has been integrated into the Eastern bloc."*

## Stalinist Rule in East Germany

By CARL G. ANTHON

*Chairman, Department of History, American University*

**A**MID THE frenetic cheers of some 2,000 Communist delegates gathered for the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Unity party (S.E.D.) in the huge Werner Seelenbinderhalle in East Berlin last January, Nikita S. Khrushchev, ruler of all the Russians, and his satrap, Walter Ulbricht, the Communist dictator of Eastern Germany, ostentatiously demonstrated their friendship with kisses and fraternal embraces. This was the customary ritual among party comrades, but it signified the renewed expression of confidence in Ulbricht, despite the obvious unpopularity and apparent failures of his Stalinist regime. Here, for all the world to see, Khrushchev, the denunciator of Stalinism and the personality cult, once more gave his official blessing to a pupil and unregenerate practitioner of Stalinism.

The scene may have disappointed but could not possibly have surprised the party serfs inside and outside the congress hall, for anyone who knew the facts of life in Eastern Germany knew that the Soviet chief, irrespective of whatever displeasure he may have felt toward the most hated man in Eastern Germany, could not help but give his support and approval to his most servile servant. In fact, he had taken the trouble to come to East Berlin for just that purpose, for he realized the necessity of bolstering Ulbricht's shaky position. The latter duly paid the expected

tribute: he firmly supported his chief with regard to China and Albania, publicly chastising the errors of "these narrowminded sectarians and opponents of Marxism-Leninism." He also identified himself (most reluctantly no doubt) with Khrushchev's present peaceful co-existence policy toward West Berlin and West Germany (after the Cuban crisis of October, 1962), and promised to hasten the further integration of the East German economy into the Comecon bloc.

Duly mimicking the Communist party of the U.S.S.R. which had adopted a new party program at its Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961 proclaiming the "comprehensive construction of communism" by 1980, the S.E.D. adopted a party program (its first) proclaiming the "comprehensive building of socialism" without naming a deadline. The program, a rather vague propaganda instrument, lacked the usual overly aggressive tone with respect to the West and envisaged peaceful political, economic, and cultural competition with capitalism. To be sure, the program called for the eventual extension of socialism to *all* of Germany and reiterated the need for a confederation of the two German states "with which the Free City of West Berlin could become associated." But this was seen as a long-range goal, and for the present the program put the emphasis on strengthening the political and economic institutions and re-

sources of Eastern Germany, the better to bring about the defeat of "imperialism" and "militarism" in Western Germany and to solve the German question. Priority was to be given to economic problems in order to hasten the building of socialism and to meet the increasing demands of the U.S.S.R. and Comecon for deliveries of industrial products.

For months prior to the party congress, there had been party meetings, speeches, "popular discussions," lengthy newspaper articles (than which there is nothing duller) to prepare the population for the event. These party activities, carried out by leaders and functionaries like so many "work norms," are interesting for the new tone, and perhaps even for the new line they seem to convey. Walter Ulbricht himself, the first secretary of the Party and chairman of the State Council, set the pace in his addresses to party delegates of the Leipzig district last December. He admitted certain errors committed by the party because of the "Stalinist personality cult," resulting in some retardation in the economic and political fields. In particular he averred that a dogmatic interpretation of Stalin's ideas on economics had resulted in an overemphasis of politics at the expense of economics. Moreover, as long as the struggle with "monopolistic West Germany" took place under the adverse conditions of an "open frontier," it was necessary, Ulbricht alleged, to give priority to political considerations. But now, since the securing of the border by the erection of the Berlin Wall in August, 1961, he opined hypocritically, it had become possible to give priority to economic objectives.

Among the practical consequences of this new orientation will be more flexible (mostly higher) prices commensurate with actual production costs, higher productivity, higher quality and selection of goods, and a higher rate of reinvestment of profits. Even the dumping of goods on the world market for political reasons was to be stopped.

In a speech to the People's Chamber, Bruno Leuschner, a deputy premier, frankly admitted the economic woes, the prevailing shortages of basic foods, and difficulties ex-

isting in factories and on the collective farms. But he warned against excessive zeal by party functionaries in forcing further collectivization. "It is inadmissible," he said, "to press farmers to convert from Type I to Type II or III" (more radical forms of collectivization) as had been done in the Cottbus district. "The farmers weren't even asked. Such a sectarian attitude is damaging to us. It will give us anything but more meat and milk." Shades of Stalin's warning, "Dizzy with Success"?

All this seemed to add up to a softer line, perhaps another New Course. Self criticism and readiness to compromise were paralleled by announcements of judicial reforms and of a more conciliatory policy toward the churches. Certain illegalities and irregularities in connection with arrests were admitted by the supreme court, and Dr. Michael Benjamin, the son of the Minister of Justice (Red Hilde) Benjamin, was forced to undergo self criticism for "dogmatism."

### THE FIRST NEW COURSE

These events were reminiscent of the New Course launched just ten years ago in the U.S.S.R. and in the satellite countries after the death of Stalin. In Eastern Germany, the New Course came when economic and political tensions were at their height and took the form of relaxing pressure on workers, farmers, university students and churches. After the resolutions of the Second Party Conference in July, 1952, to "build the foundations of socialism," e.g., to step up collectivization, a veritable avalanche of refugees rolled into West Berlin and West Germany. On June 9, 1953, the Politburo of the S.E.D. announced the New Course, promising more consumer goods, milder work norms, encouragement of private initiative and capital, generous treatment for returning refugees, liberalization of interzonal travel and a host of other concessions.

These measures, if properly carried out, would have meant slowing down and perhaps modifying the "building of socialism" and the process of sovietizing Eastern Germany. This was meant as a strategic retreat, not an



abandonment of the main party line, just as the New Economic Policy had been introduced by Lenin in 1921 for strategic reasons. In Eastern Germany the concessions had the effect of unleashing the pent up dissatisfaction of the population against the regime, culminating in the dramatic, but tragic June Revolt, just one week after the proclamation of the New Course. The rising of the workers in East Berlin and of people throughout the Soviet Zone of Germany was quelled, as everyone knows, by Soviet tanks. It was the only means to save a discredited, tottering regime, and the disillusion of the East Germans over the inactivity of the Western powers at this propitious moment (when a struggle for power was raging in the Kremlin) was profound and lasting.

A revitalized Ulbricht regime felt strong enough to wreak vengeance on the participants in the revolt and on rival leaders in the Politburo who had advocated a different road to socialism. The minister of state security, Wilhelm Zaisser, the minister of justice, Max Fechner, as well as the editor of the party organ *Neues Deutschland*, Rudolf Herrnstadt, and lesser figures were dismissed from government and party offices for "defeatism" and "anti-party factionalism." Ulbricht and his clique emerged victorious in the struggle for power, and after a brief wave of self-criticism and compromises, the old course was resumed.

After the Twentieth Congress of the Communist party in the U.S.S.R. in 1956, and particularly after the Hungarian revolt of the same year, another wave of purges was launched against the advocates of "revisionism." Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's crimes and the de-Stalinization process in Russia encouraged a number of Communist party leaders and intellectuals in Eastern Germany to press for reforms and concessions. At first, Ulbricht was indeed constrained to simulate de-Stalinization. A number of party leaders, purged in 1950 and 1953, were rehabilitated or, at least, freed from prison and partially reinstated in government and party positions. However, sensing the dissatisfaction and the desire of

some party leaders to go much further, Ulbricht realized the tremendous danger threatening his regime. He later admitted, at a party congress in Budapest in 1959, that in 1956-1957 he feared another revolt of the population.

He therefore decided promptly to take preventive measures. In November, 1956, Dr. Wolfgang Harich, a young Marxist instructor of philosophy at the University of Berlin, was arrested, and after a secret trial, was sentenced as a "counter-revolutionary" to ten years in prison. Another prominent intellectual, Ernst Bloch, professor of philosophy at Leipzig University, who had spent his exile in the days of the Third Reich in the United States, was forcibly retired and forbidden to enter the grounds of the philosophy department of the university. He was to be arrested but for political reasons this was halted at the last moment. In 1961, after the erection of the Berlin Wall, Bloch chose to remain in West Germany where he had been vacationing.

Harich and a group of colleagues, several of whom were also arrested, had worked out a reform program which would have liberalized and democratized somewhat the Communist regime and which was designed to smooth the path toward reunification with Western Germany. Among the suggested reforms were: change of the People's Chamber to a genuine parliament, dissolution of the secret police and reestablishment of justice, full amnesty for political prisoners, decentralization of the economy, and freedom of the press and of all cultural activities. In other words, the program (which was worked out openly in the *Aufbau* publishing firm, with the participation of the minister of culture, Johannes Becher) represented a "third road," a German road, to socialism, to a regime of national communism which would permit German reunification and liberate Eastern Germany from the grip of Moscow.

#### FURTHER PURGES

The elimination of the Harich group was only the prelude to further purges in 1957-1958. Harich and his followers were intellec-

tuals, but there were many high-ranking party leaders whose objectives after the Hungarian revolt coincided with the reform program of the former. To this opposition group belonged the Politburo members Karl Schirdewan, Fred Oelssner (the party ideologist), and Ernst Wollweber, the minister for state security, and a host of lesser men. All of them were relieved of their positions and expelled from the party for "factionalism against the party." Schirdewan was forced to admit, "I stood for a mechanistic and . . . opportunistic application of the resolutions of the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to our situation. . . ."

The main error of the Schirdewan group, said Fritz Selbmann, the deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission who was himself involved in the affair, was that they tried to apply the resolutions of the Twentieth Party Congress to the S.E.D.'s policy toward Western Germany. In order to decrease international tension and to facilitate the reunification of Germany they felt it was necessary to slow up the building of socialism. This was precisely the basic principle underlying the New Course in 1953, but now it was pronounced a heresy. It has been surmised that Schirdewan and his comrades had the tacit support of the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin; it would, in fact, be unrealistic for these seasoned party functionaries to entertain opposition to Ulbricht without securing some kind of backing from Soviet quarters. At any rate, it was noted that the Soviet ambassador, G. M. Pushkin, was abruptly and quietly recalled shortly after the Schirdewan affair. Khrushchev no doubt understood Ulbricht's reasons for resisting de-Stalinization.

After the liquidation of the opposition—less drastic, for the time being, at least, than Stalin's purges—Ulbricht felt strong enough to resume the tempo of sovietization. (Note: this term is being used here advisedly because socialization under the peculiar conditions in Eastern Germany means direct mimicry of Soviet Russia.) The fifth S.E.D. party congress in July, 1958, proclaimed the program for the "completion of the building

of socialism." In the following year, again emulating the Soviets, the party switched from its second Five Year Plan, still uncompleted, to a Seven Year Plan which was geared to run synchronously with that adopted in Russia the same year. By the end of this Seven Year Plan in 1965, socialism was to be completed, the industrial production to be increased by 88 per cent, and the standard of living to have surpassed that of Western Germany. Yet the production of heavy industries was again to be given priority over consumer goods, so that the prospects for a real improvement of the standard of living were slight. In fact, the Seven Year Plan reflected the Soviet demand for increased deliveries of machinery and finished goods; the production of raw materials was to be held back somewhat and the difference was to be made up by imports from Comecon countries.

Then, in early 1960, came the campaign of forced collectivization of the remaining private farms (roughly 50 per cent). The decision, long postponed, was taken, as Ulbricht himself acknowledged, to create a *fait accompli* prior to the summit meeting to be held in Paris in May of that year. The meeting was to discuss, among other things, the German question. Ulbricht wanted to confront Western statesmen with a fully and "freely" socialized agricultural economy. This purely political measure was carried out in the face of the indisputable fact that the productive capacity of the free farmers was substantially greater than that of the collectives.

### RUTHLESS COLLECTIVIZATION

Collectivization was accomplished with the characteristic Communist ruthlessness. Within a little over three months, from February to April, 1960, as many farms were collectivized as had been collectivized during the eight years preceding. The methods used were similar to those applied in Stalin's Russia in the early 1930's. Many farmers who fled to Western Germany in those months of terror described the pressure tactics, threats, and in some cases, actual physical

torture applied to unwilling farmers. Teams of "agitators" would descend upon the villages, subject the farmers individually and collectively to "discussions" and with hints and a show of force would induce them to sign up for a collective. The names of particularly tenacious farmers would be broadcast over loudspeakers or posted on bulletin boards in the village square. Police and security officials were strategically posted around the village.

Some farmers tried to commit suicide, some succeeded, and many fled to the West after they had been forced to sign. By the middle of April all 14 districts of Eastern Germany were "fully socialized." The party workers had fulfilled their work norms: some 950,000 independent farmers had been pressed into 19,345 collectives. Among the results, aside from the incalculable human tragedies, was another serious setback in agricultural production from which East German agriculture has not recovered and probably never will.

During this year of socialist success, Ulbricht was able further to consolidate his dictatorship. On September 7, 1960, Wilhelm Pieck, president of the German Democratic Republic, died at the age of 84 years. This gave Ulbricht another opportunity to mimic the Soviet Union by substituting a collective presidency, a Council of State, for the former one-man presidency. This new body, consisting of a chairman (Ulbricht), six deputy chairmen, and 16 members, was endowed with considerable additional powers which overlapped the executive and legislative powers of existing institutions. Thus, Ulbricht, like Hitler before him, utilized the death of a president to combine the functions of head of government and chief of state.

Ulbricht's assumption of the "presidency" was made the occasion for an amnesty which freed some 3,500 political prisoners, leaving, however, some 10,000 to languish in East German labor camps and prisons. In this context it should be noted that East German police methods and judicial procedures today still reflect some of the harshest features of Stalinist practices. Agents of the security

police have carried out numerous kidnappings in West Berlin, using guile, poison, drugs, or brute force. Questionings in prison cellars, often for several months, employ the whole spectrum of physical and psychic pressures to wrench a confession out of the victim. In the camps and prisons beatings and torture are perhaps no longer the rule, but are still reported by former inmates.

Perhaps nowhere is the Stalinist character of the Ulbricht regime more evident and vicious than at the borders which surround the East German state, including the recently erected wall in Berlin. Barbed wire fences, mined "death strips," watchtowers, bunkers and trenches guard the "First German Workers' and Farmers' State," not against invaders, but against escape from the vast concentration camp that is Eastern Germany. The Berlin Wall is the scene of almost daily brutalities, tragedies, and dramatic escapes; some 20,000 persons of all ages and walks of life escaped during the first 12 months after August 13, 1961. The special border troops are under orders to shoot anyone trying to escape, although it appears that some of them, at least, are reluctant to carry out this inhuman order.

The whole free world shuddered when on August 17, 1962, East German guards fired on an 18-year old worker, Peter Fechter, and callously allowed him to bleed to death just a few feet inside the wall. American soldiers stationed at "Checkpoint Charlie" apparently acted under orders to do nothing to help escapees on the Communist side of the wall, despite the fact that West German authorities (and one would presume, American authorities, too) knew for months that East German guards had orders *not* to shoot at Allied soldiers even if they went inside the Communist sector to help a wounded escapee.

The erection of the wall of concrete and barbed wire which seemed to symbolize the final split of Germany produced a shock among East Germans and West Germans alike, and greatly increased criticism and dissatisfaction with the Ulbricht regime. A new wave of terror was unleashed by the police and the courts in order to deal with critics

and escapees and with those who assisted escapees. During the 12 months following the building of the wall, there were 4 death sentences, 11 life sentences, and 873 sentences for imprisonment up to 15 years. Even trivial gestures, such as hoarding or criticism of travel restrictions, labeled as "sabotage," "speculation" and "boycott agitation," brought extremely severe penalties.

### A SOVIETIZED SATELLITE

The status of Eastern Germany today is that of a completely sovietized satellite. The political and economic systems, education and culture, youth and the family, have been molded, outwardly at least, according to the Soviet pattern. Politically, economically and militarily, East Germany has been integrated into the Eastern bloc. The whole economy has been built up and geared to the needs of the Comecon countries and particularly those of the Soviet Union. Nearly 50 per cent of East German exports go to the U.S.S.R.; 80 per cent to the Communist countries (including the Soviet Union). Eastern Germany furnishes 20 per cent of Russia's total imports and thus ranks as the latter's chief trading partner. Next in importance to Soviet Russia as trade partners of Eastern Germany are Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria.

By decision of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon) an "international socialist division of labor" in industrial and raw materials production has been set up, calling for fairly rigid specialization among the individual member states. Eastern Germany, of course, as the most advanced industrial region among the satellites (she is the largest exporter of machinery among Eastern bloc countries) has been called upon to deliver huge quantities of heavy and light machinery, chemicals, consumer goods, railroad rolling stock, ships and optical and scientific instruments. In return for these highly complex and valuable goods, Eastern Germany receives from the Soviet Union and the satellites largely raw materials, such as hard coal, coke, oil, cotton, timber, ores and wheat and other foods. The economic plans

of the member states have been coordinated to achieve the desired specialization as early as possible.

With the proclamation of an "economic association with the Soviet Union" in 1962, Eastern Germany has already gone further than any other satellite toward economic integration. Comecon plans call for a common electric power network; Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have already formed such a network. A 2,500 mile "pipeline of friendship" is being built to deliver oil from Kuibichev and Baku to the Eastern European satellites and to Eastern Germany, which is building a huge refinery at Schwedt on the Oder river. Besides greatly expanding its shipbuilding industry, 80 per cent of whose products go to Russia, Eastern Germany planned to develop the little Baltic port of Rostock into a big seaport. But the Polish comrades, fearing competition for their own port of Stettin, forced Ulbricht's planners, through an appropriate directive from Comecon, to limit the expansion to 50 per cent of the original plans.

A similar setback was experienced in the airplane industry which Eastern Germany had begun to build up at tremendous cost. After turning out a few propeller-driven Ilyushin 14's and jet passenger planes, Type B 152, the East German government was forced (again by an order from Comecon) to abandon the industry altogether. For the same reasons, Comecon requested Eastern Germany not to build up the auto and textile industries which would indeed have been economically meaningful and profitable but which would have competed with those industries in other Comecon countries.

The development of East German industry after 1945 had taken place under Soviet guidance and for Soviet benefit. Hence, Eastern Germany was to be built up as rapidly as possible into a major industrial state and emphasis was accordingly put on production goods and heavy industry. A typical example of this forced industrialization was the erection in the swamps of the Oder of the huge iron works, baptized Stalin-



stadt but since November, 1961, re-baptized *Eisenhuettenstadt* (i.e. iron works city). This was planned as a vertical combine that would produce everything from raw iron and steel to finished steel products. After investing 1.5 billion Eastmarks (c. \$600 million at official exchange rates) into this fantastic project which had to procure its iron ore from Krivoi Rog in the Ukraine and its coal from Polish Silesia, construction was halted. The whole plant was then limited to the unprofitable production of pig iron for other existing steel works in Eastern Germany.

It goes without saying that the imposition of Soviet economic norms on the East German economy has produced chronic difficulties and has hindered the improvement of the standard of living. Despite the one-sided boosting of heavy industries at the expense of consumer goods, the index of total industrial production in East Germany in 1960 was only 139 (based on 1938) in contrast to West German industrial production which stood at 172. Figured in another way, Eastern Germany with a population (17 million) one-third that of Western Germany, produced only one-fourth as much, although the per capita prewar industrial productive capacity in the two parts of Germany was approximately the same. It is all the more surprising, in view of the shortage of labor and other existing difficulties, that Eastern Germany is forced to continue the vast uranium mining operations of the Soviet-German Wismuth corporation in Saxony and Thuringia, employing some 140,000, for the sole benefit of the Soviet Union.

After substantial growth and improvement of the economy during the late 1950's, there has been a marked decline since 1960. Annual plan quotas remained unfulfilled in key areas, as admitted by East German officials; and industrial bottlenecks and shortages of consumer goods, and worst of all, of staple foods and fuels became chronic in 1962-1963. Having abolished food rationing at last in 1958, shortages in meat, butter, milk, potatoes and vegetables have forced the government to reintroduce a modified rationing system in the form of "customer lists."

Party functionaries blamed bad harvests but were constrained to admit negligence and "administrative" errors. The basic reason for the failure of agriculture was, of course, forced collectivization, aggravated by inflexible bureaucratic planning. On top of food shortages, the East Germans suffered from fuel shortages—and this during an unusually cold winter. Schools, museums and other public buildings had to be closed for weeks, certain factories were shut down and their workers sent to the coal mines.

Because of this desperate situation, the East German regime sounded out the West German government last year with regard to a large long-term credit of around three billion marks (\$750 million). Negotiations have dragged along on the interzonal trade level, with the West Germans demanding a lifting of restrictions at the Berlin Wall as a *quid pro quo*, a demand which Ulbricht has seen fit to label "immoral." Although many East Germans seem to be opposed to granting this shot in the arm to the hated Ulbricht regime, the West German government seems disposed to approve such a credit for political concessions. Considering that the East Germans received credits of a similar amount from Soviet Russia which were apparently used up in one single year, it may not be far fetched to assume that the Ulbricht regime is bankrupt. Whether or not Ulbricht's critics in the party who advocated some kind of "third road" to socialism are behind this credit approach to Western Germany, it does not take much clairvoyance to see that the continued, inflexible imposition of political dogma on economic life has brought Eastern Germany to this ruinous condition.

### A NEW SEVEN YEAR PLAN

It is for this reason that the S.E.D. leaders, following a hint from Khrushchev, have called a halt to party zealots and have switched to a new line which gives priority to economics. The grandiose Seven Year Plan adopted in 1959, the boastful aim to reach and surpass Western Germany's standard of living by 1961, were quietly dropped and a new Seven Year Plan was adopted for the years 1964 to

1970. The chairman of the State Planning Commission, Karl Mewis, was dismissed in January, 1963, and replaced by Erich Apel. In contrast to most planning bureaucrats in Eastern Germany, Apel has had professional training and experience in economics. The measure signified a shift from rigid party ideology to economics and was no doubt a popular one since Mewis was a fanatical party functionary who had pushed through collectivization.

Again and again S.E.D. bosses have freely admitted failures and mistakes and called on their comrades to achieve greater productivity, higher quality and lower production costs. But how is this to be achieved with personal initiative throttled, with shortages of labor and raw materials, and with an empty stomach? As one Politburo member, Hermann Matern, recently expressed it, "To have nothing to eat and socialism—these things don't go together."

Under these circumstances one may well wonder how much longer the Ulbricht regime will be able to maintain itself. Is it possible to gauge the attitude of the population toward the regime? This was easy to answer as long as thousands of refugees streamed into West Berlin. But even the trickle of refugees today and the sporadic contacts which still exist between Germans on both sides of the Elbe reveal certain conclusions about the psychological situation in Eastern Germany. On the one hand, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of the population, including members of the S.E.D. and the Communist "mass organizations" (the Free German Youth, Free German Labor Federation, and so on) reject Ulbricht and his policies. They reject him because he is a Soviet puppet, because of his personality and dictatorial policies, because of the frightful consequences of his regime. He utterly lacks popular support, and in this respect the Communist dictatorship in Eastern Germany differs very markedly from the Nazi dictatorship which indeed enjoyed a mass following. On the other hand, it is equally clear that the people have had to accommodate themselves to the inevitable as best they

can. They have largely lost faith in the ability or willingness of the West to undertake anything to bring about reunification of Germany. They have been sorely disillusioned about the West's ability to stand up to the Kremlin during the June revolt of 1953, the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 or the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

The response of the Kennedy administration to the Cuban crisis in October, 1962, has heartened many people and has injected a new interest in politics among the otherwise apathetic population. They continue to listen to West German radio stations and particularly to RIAS, the American radio station in West Berlin, although they do so at considerable risk. This contact with the West is of tremendous importance in maintaining the moral fiber of the population and these media facilities should be strengthened as much as possible. Western observers should not be misled by the fact that people join Communist organizations or occupy official positions; they must "give to Caesar" in order to exist. There no longer is the alternative to leave for the West. Nor would they all want to leave, since many of them have become increasingly critical of the selfish materialism that seems to dominate life in Western Germany. Many of them would frankly like to see a truly socialist society, not of the Ulbricht or Kremlin variety, but perhaps of the kind existing in Gomulka's Poland.

Nor must one ignore the fact that years of indoctrination, of relative isolation from Western ideas and information, inevitably have had their effect on people's minds, especially on the youth and children. The

*(Continued on page 309)*

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*Nothing "has really changed in Czechoslovakia in the early 1960's. And Yet the atmosphere is no longer the same. . . . What has changed and is still changing is the world outside Czechoslovakia. . . ."*

## Czechoslovakia: A Dull Drama

By IVO DUCHACEK

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FOR THE past five years no spectacular drama has disturbed the ash-gray surface of Czechoslovakia, the dullest of the Soviet satellites. The ruling Party has continued to follow Moscow's line slavishly, except when it came to de-Stalinization. Then the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, visibly embarrassed, trailed behind Russia and most of the other satellites with deliberate slowness.

The people, on the other hand, have remained keenly aware of the overwhelming shadow which the physical power of the Soviet Union casts over East Central Europe; this awareness was reinforced in 1956 as a consequence of Soviet intervention in Hungary. Sceptical as to the possibility of change in the local situation through local means, the people keep on scanning such distant horizons as Cuba or China with the hope of detecting signs of a chain reaction, that may ultimately affect the nations of East Central Europe.

The gap between the ruling Party and the people and between their hopes and outlook remains as wide as before. Body-and-soul annihilating boredom rather than despair characterizes the life of the Czech and Slovak peoples; they are neither well-clothed nor naked; neither satisfied nor hungry; neither free nor harshly persecuted. It is a drab life in a totalitarian twilight. The Party seems

to be aware of its incapacity to attain its objectives. "When young people are confronted with a fundamental gap between the Communist ideal and Communist reality, they lose confidence," wrote a Communist literary magazine.<sup>1</sup> "Scepticism transforms itself almost into nihilism. Sometimes I dread that we might even lose our illusions about communism when we finally attain it."

Similarly, however, the non-Communist majority is pessimistic about the attainment of their objectives. The totalitarian technique succeeds in containing these opposite poles in an iron framework. The Czechoslovak case confirms the effectiveness of a modern welfare-garrison state. Being the sole distributor of jobs and therefore the source of life itself the State insures the submissiveness and cooperation of the masses by implicit or explicit threats to the citizen's status in society (which includes not only the job itself but the right to children, higher education, housing, choice of residence and so on). The state may actually increase its capacity to secure cooperation on the part of almost all as a consequence of a slight improvement of the standard of living. The ultimate threat of death or forced labor may become unnecessary precisely because the standard of living has been raised above the subsistence level.

In 1960, Czechoslovakia adopted a new constitution; it codified the regime's claim that Czechoslovakia has now moved from the

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<sup>1</sup> *Literární Noviny*, Prague, January 12, 1963.

lower level of socialism (people's democracy) to the higher level of real socialism where the development of the highest form of socialism, communism, may begin. The official name of the country was changed to Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, C.S.S.R. Apparently this was done with Moscow's blessings but without any international fanfare because other people's democracies in East Central Europe and in Asia could be offended by Czechoslovakia's claim to be second to the Soviet Union in reaching socialism—a level allegedly reached by Russia in 1936 when it was codified in Stalin's constitution.

### ECONOMIC REALITIES

The economic realities deny the validity of the regime's claim. Having lived on the industrial basis of the capitalist era for 15 years Communist management of the Czechoslovak economy added little in terms of balanced expansion and renovation. Industrial equipment inherited from the capitalist economy begins dangerously to wear out without any immediate prospect of being replaced and modernized. On the other hand, because of ideological considerations and Soviet directives some of the traditionally healthy and balanced features of the Czechoslovak economy have been distorted. Communism has cut Czechoslovakia off from her previous lucrative markets in the West. Communist bureaucratization and politically motivated experimentation have resulted in constant deterioration of the quality of once renowned Czechoslovak industrial products. Such a decline tends to squeeze out Czechoslovak products from their traditional markets, ir-

respective of the cold war. Overambitious industrial projects, bearing the mark of Stalin's era, and disastrous experimentation in agriculture complete the picture of economic failures at the very moment when Czechoslovakia claims that the advanced economic basis for building communism has already been reached.

The gap between the uses of advanced technology for the purpose of Communist political goals at home and abroad, on the one hand, and the neglect of consumers, on the other, may be illustrated by the following quote, published in a Communist weekly.<sup>2</sup>

"It helps us little if while traveling between Prague and Brno we may listen to cultural radio programs broadcast over the train amplifiers when, at the same time, all the windows on the train are dirty and their curtains remain unwashed for several years [*sic!*]. Upon arrival in Brno [second largest city in Czechoslovakia] we are all full of dust as a result of neglect of cleaning of the coaches' interiors. . . . Also the drab dark brown color inside the coaches seems to be the same as it was in 1900 [i.e. under the Habsburgs]."

This complaint concerning the gap between advanced technology in some fields and total neglect in others, while addressed to the Czechoslovak railroads, can be stretched to include almost all aspects of the regime's services to the people—retail trade, repair shops, housing and food distribution.<sup>3</sup>

### RESENTMENT

In such a situation there is little wonder that the masses particularly resent two aspects of Communist economic policies: foreign aid and technical assistance programs to underdeveloped countries; and the economic integration of the Communist bloc under the direction of CEMA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, also sometimes called COMECON).

Together with East Germany and Poland, Czechoslovakia plays an important role as a major supplier of capital goods, skills, weapons and consumer products to Asia, Africa and Latin America. Easy credits and out-

<sup>2</sup> *Tvorba*, Prague, October 4, 1962.

<sup>3</sup> From Prague came the following story sarcastically contrasting the Soviet cosmic achievements with the dreary life of an average housewife: A Czech journalist called on a Soviet astronaut and found only his small daughter at home.

"Where is your dad?" he asked.

"Oh, he's orbiting around the world."

"When will he be back?"

"In about an hour."

"And where is your mother?"

"Mother is standing in line for meat outside the butcher's shop."

"When will she be back?"

"Not in four hours."



right gifts sent to those areas are particularly resented by the population. In the middle of the Cuban crisis a Czechoslovak housewife, standing in line for food, was able to contrast the following two news items published in the Communist *Rudé Právo*:

"Farm production is lagging and it is unable to cover the fast growing food requirement of the population."<sup>4</sup> The newspaper added that in order to balance the gap between production and consumption, good products had to be imported and paid largely by the products of the industry. Yet the same newspaper printed also the following news item distributed by Castro's agency, *Prensa Latina*:

The working class of Cuba received the food shipments presented by C.S.S.R. with enthusiastic demonstrations of gratitude. . . . The foreign trade ministry noted that "we have received another demonstration of support and solidarity from the sister republic in the face of the constant attacks upon us by decadent imperialism." The ministry also noted that the gift was made to the people of Cuba "so that they can face the blockade with which the imperialists are in vain trying to crush our victorious revolution."

The Czechoslovak shipment which was

<sup>4</sup>In 1960 Czechoslovakia imported 1,997,000 tons of grain, 110,000 tons of meat, 154,000 tons of oil seeds, 57,000 tons of fish and 14,000 tons of butter. These statistical figures were contained in the July 1961 issue of the Czechoslovak Official Foreign Trade monthly, in an article by Miroslav Parkán.

<sup>5</sup>In foreign trade with the Communist bloc only East Germany has a closer trade relationship with the U.S.S.R. In an article entitled "C.S.S.R.—the second biggest trade partner of the Soviet Union," *Mlada Fronta* (August 31, 1962) pointed out that the Soviet Union exported to Czechoslovakia goods valued at 587.4 million rubles while Czechoslovak exports to Russia reached the amount of 627.6 million rubles (total almost \$1.4 billion). The article stressed that the Soviet Union selflessly exported food to Czechoslovakia "although the Soviet Union experienced some food shortages itself."

<sup>6</sup>*Rude Pravo*, December 5, 1962.

<sup>7</sup>Minister of Foreign Trade, František Krajčír (*Rudé Právo*, November 22, 1962) described the trade agreements with Cuba as follows: "Czechoslovakia primarily exports to Cuba capital goods, namely seven power stations, one cement factory with a half million ton capacity, and transportation vehicles of all kinds, buses, cars, lorries, motorcycles. Cuba sends us nickel, copper, manganese, chrome, citrus fruit, coffee and tobacco." In view of the cost of capital goods the Cuban exports would have to reach a colossal scale to match the Czechoslovak imports.

allowed to pass through the U.S. quarantine; because it did not contain any weapons, consisted of 100 tons of vegetables, 50 tons of cheese, 76 tons of condensed milk, 70 tons of crackers, 2,000 tons of malt for beer; there were also 400 motorcycles, 15 cranes and an unspecified number of tractors, refrigerated trucks and textiles.

In addition to foreign aid programs or gifts, regular trade with underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa represents today 40 per cent of Czechoslovakia's total trade with non-Communist countries.<sup>5</sup> On behalf of Moscow, Czechoslovakia capitalizes upon the prewar good name of its products as well as on its image of a small country which is beyond any suspicion as a potential imperialist but is endowed with an industrial capacity almost equal to that of a great power.

The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev, gave industrial Czechoslovakia the following pat on the shoulder: "Czechoslovakia produces today more steel, pig iron, coal and cement *per capita* than such capitalist countries as the United States, Great Britain and France. It would be difficult to discover a country in the world today which would not be acquainted with the industrial goods produced by the golden [*sic!*] hands of the diligent and skillful peoples of CSSR."<sup>6</sup>

Czechoslovakia also appears reasonably successful in its selection of technicians to assist underdeveloped countries. Many a Czechoslovak engineer does an excellent job, for he welcomes an assignment to Latin America, Asia and Africa as a desirable escape from the monotony and surveillance of Communist totalitarianism. One Slovak engineer admitted to the author recently that at long last he was able to enjoy a Western newspaper and a Hollywood movie when he reached his destination south of the Himalayas. The number of those who in this manner enjoy or profit from Communist technical assistance programs is, of course, infinitesimal in comparison with those who consider this the Soviet milking of Czechoslovakia.<sup>7</sup>

The second target of popular resentment

is the economic integration of the Communist Bloc, particularly its heavily propagandized feature, the "socialist division of labor." Under the coordinating direction of several working committees of CEMA, Eastern European people's democracies are asked to specialize in their major industrial and agricultural fields instead of aiming at a degree of balanced self-sufficiency in all fields.

We must not build the foundations of communist society according to the principle "Everyone for himself. . . ." This would be in contradiction to proletarian internationalism [noted the official organ of the Communist party on August 26, 1962, in an article entitled "A Great Family"]. There were times when with pride we used to announce that our industry was capable to produce everything from giant machinery to miniature gadgets. . . . This, however, prevented specialization. . . . Now we have to concentrate on those fields in which we will be most useful to ourselves and our friends.

The article concluded by describing the integrated future when, in addition to the Soviet pipeline<sup>8</sup> which now provides East Central Europe with oil from a central Soviet source there would be also one common power network and one common economy in which "our resources and our wealth would be used and developed in the best possible manner."

### NATIONALISM AND ECONOMICS

Czechoslovak workers and managers appear to have some doubts that Czechoslovak wealth will indeed be used and developed in the most useful manner from the Czechoslovak point of view. According to the "socialist division of labor," for instance, Poland is to concentrate on shipbuilding and machinery while Czechoslovakia is to devote its efforts primarily to the development of machine production for heavy industry, especially for chemical and power industries.

<sup>8</sup> Práce, Prague, November 7, 1962: "Day and night the Soviet oil streams into Czechoslovakia through the pipeline Friendship (Družba). Today, when we recall the glorious October Revolution, the Slovnaft refinery notes that 1,500,000 tons of oil have reached the plant since the inauguration of the pipeline on February 22, 1962."

<sup>9</sup> *Nová Svoboda*, June 6, 1962.

Further detailed distribution of production of different types of machinery is studied and reported in the press in the form of *communiqués* from a great many coordinating committees of CEMA. As a result, some Czechoslovak factories have already been closed to implement CEMA's specialization plan. In one particular case, in Northern Bohemia, the government decision to curtail production in the name of the division of labor within the Bloc was resisted by a solid front consisting of Communist managers and directors of the factory, and Communist as well as non-Communist workers. The regional Party secretary sent to settle the issue was thrown out of the meeting. The incident, culminating in physical violence, showed that, at least on some issues, the lower echelons of the Party, plant management and non-Communist workers tend to coalesce in their opposition to the Party and government leadership. As a consequence, the dividing line between the rulers and the masses does not follow the oversimplified image of the "Party-versus-the people." It is more complex. In our era of nationalism even the Communists, thinking in national terms, try to maintain some degree of self-sufficiency to avoid becoming a raw material source for other comrade republics. When the issue of national economic autonomy coincides with resentment against the possibility of at least temporary and local unemployment, the issue may become inflammable. In such a context the slogan of socialist division of labor tends to be ridiculed as a new edition of colonialism: "The Soviet Union divides the labor by assigning the work to Czechoslovakia and its fruit to itself or Cuba."

Recently a Party paper<sup>9</sup> admitted the high level of general discontent in an article subjecting to severe criticism those Party members who tend to meet popular dissatisfaction not only with passivity or apathy but even with approval:

The last months have demonstrated that demagogues and enemies have shrewdly exploited some of our economic difficulties. Slyly but often openly doubts were spread about the Communist principles of economy, policy, culture and human

relations. Demagogues and enemies attacked the principle of democratic centralism, advocated rotten liberalism and absolute freedom of demagoguery and slander under the guise of so-called unlimited freedom of criticism. There were even cases when we heard viewpoints aimed at proletarian internationalism. It is understandable that reactionary and backward elements of our population flock around our present economic difficulties. But it is highly incorrect when members of the Communist party not only keep silent but even accept, and agree to, such viewpoints. It is possible that sometimes our comrades have no ready answer or counter-argument but in most cases what is lacking is simply courage on their part and desire to enter into argument.

While the regime presents the economic integration of the Bloc as a necessary step in building communism and only partly as a response to the Common Market (although this, in reality, is perhaps the major reason for the increased tempo of integration), the man in the street tends to see in integration a further threat to his hopes for a better and freer future and another phase in the progressive alienation of East Europe from West Europe.

So far we have been dealing with the life, hopes and regrets of the majority of the Czech and Slovak peoples. Now our attention will turn to the ruling minority, the top leadership of the Party and government.

## **STALINISM**

As previously noted, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program in 1956 and its second phase in 1961 were implemented by Prague with hesitancy. Only six years after Khrushchev's speech against Stalin, the Czechoslovak Party leadership decided to dismantle the granite monument of the Soviet leader which for so many years had cast its monstrous shadow over baroque Prague. It was indeed the largest memorial to the Soviet dictator built anywhere in the world. Significantly, however, the memorial was not to be replaced by a monument celebrating a Czech personality, Communist or otherwise. It was to be again a memorial extolling the virtue of the "undying and eternal Soviet-Czechoslovak link," in a word, another monument express-

ing Czechoslovak leaders' slavish dependence on Moscow.

In December, 1962, the Stalinist leadership of the Party was itself reconfirmed at the Twelfth Party Congress in the presence of the Soviet delegate, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev. The Soviet delegate, after hearing the Czechoslovak denunciation of Albanian and Chinese dogmatists and the praise for Soviet action in the Cuban crisis, issued the appropriate seal of approval: "At the helm of the Central Committee of the C.P.C we see the faithful son of the Czechoslovak people, our [!] great friend, comrade Antonin Novotny." The real—Russian—basis of Novotny's authority in Czechoslovakia could not be more clearly expressed.

Thus the Party which claims a membership of 1,588,589 (and 92,230 candidates) remained under the direction of the same leadership core which has guided the Party from Stalin to Khrushchev. While in the early 1960's two purges disturbed the Party and mildly amused the non-Party majority of the people, neither affected the inner circle of the Party leadership. One of the purges was safe because it was posthumous. The second sent to jail a former Social Democrat whose relative popularity among the workers—and his former position as head of the police—proved to be no match for Novotny's Party machinery and his Russian support.

The posthumous purge cut to size Klement Gottwald, first Communist President of Czechoslovakia (1948–1953) and chairman of the Party. He had presided over its destinies from the 1930's until its final triumph in February, 1948. The posthumous purge followed the Russian model in every macabre detail. Like Stalin's life and career, Gottwald's life and career were neatly divided into two sectors: one (until 1948) to be generally praised, the other (1948–1953) to be damned. The charges levelled against Gottwald were somewhat nebulous: he was accused of losing contact with the masses after February, 1948; indulging in the cult of his own personality; and lacking vigilance with regard to the treacherous activities of the

Secretary General of the Party, Rudolf Slansky. In 1952 (while "non-vigilant" Gottwald was still President), Rudolf Slansky and ten other top party leaders were convicted for high treason and hanged.

## PURGES

The Slansky trial of 1952 bore unmistakable marks of "proletarian anti-Semitism," characteristic of the last years of Stalin's rule. One "crime" seems to be missing from Gottwald's list: his sudden death which followed that of Stalin within nine days. This indeed could have been construed to represent an exaggerated form of Gottwald's cult of Stalin's personality, literally reaching beyond the grave.

As a logical consequence of the posthumous purge, Gottwald was denied the privilege of remaining mummified in a glass-topped coffin at the Vitkov Hill mausoleum. Like Stalin, Gottwald was, so to speak, "de-mausoleumized." After cremation, Gottwald's ashes were re-buried "in a manner consistent with Leninist understanding of the role of personality and collective leadership," as Prime Minister Viliam Siroky put it. Unlike the secret reburial near the Kremlin wall, the reburial of Gottwald's urn was a family affair. It was attended by top Party and government leaders. The Czechoslovak national anthem as well as the International and the March of Fallen Revolutionaries were played.

Thus, by an interesting twist, unique behind the Iron Curtain, the present leadership of the Party maintained the interesting thesis according to which both Gottwald, the organizer of the last spectacular Stalinist trial, and Slansky, the victim of the trial, were equally guilty of gross Stalinist crimes of the cult of personality and violation of socialist legality.

However, those who were imprisoned during the Stalinist bloody purge of 1952, have now been freed. They are allowed to hold Party and government positions. This is true of Slovak Nationalist Communists and intellectuals such as Laco Novomesky, Gustav Husak, and Daniel Okali, whose leader, Foreign Minister Vlado Clementis, was hanged

in 1952 for the alleged crime of national communism. This is also the case of Bohuslav Lastovicka, a former member of the International Brigade in Spain and, under the Gottwald-and-Slansky duumvirate, Vice-Minister of National Defense. Although involved in the Slansky trial of 1952, Lastovicka emerged first as a candidate, and in December, 1962, as a full member of the Party's Central Committee.

The second purge of the 1960's was directed against Rudolf Barak, member of the Party Politburo, Vice-Premier of the Cabinet, and former Minister of Interior. Following a short and relatively unspectacular trial Barak was condemned in 1962 to 15 years in prison. He was allegedly convicted of embezzlement of Party funds, illegal purchases of consumer goods and works of arts in the West, and excessive political ambitions. These could hardly be the real reasons for the trial and condemnation. Excessive ambition, illegitimate use of public funds and personal purchases in the West are common failings of most Party dignitaries behind the Iron Curtain. As some articles in the Communist press clearly suggest, Barak's real crime was his challenge to Novotny's leadership. Under the guise of de-Stalinization he tried to remove colorless, Stalinist Novotny from his top position as President of the Republic and chairman of the Party. In the words of the official organ of the Party, *Rudé Právo*, Barak was a "great careerist and adventurer" who "did everything from the standpoint of his ambition; he aimed at the highest function in the state." Obviously, in a people's democracy, following the dictum that every boy can be president is hazardous.

Not unlike Beria, Rudolf Barak perhaps overestimated his former power as head of Czechoslovakia's national police. It was again confirmed that in a clash with the head of the Communist police, he who has direct access to the central party files as First Secretary maintains a definite margin of power. An interesting difference between the Russian and Czechoslovak frameworks should also be noted. In Russia in his personal struggle for power Khrushchev capitalized upon the popu-



larity of his denunciation of Stalin's crimes. Thus he succeeded in removing from the scene the legitimate but unpopular close collaborators of Stalin and therefore his logical successors (Malenkov, Molotov, Beria, or Kaganovich). In Czechoslovakia, on the contrary, the leaders closely identified with Stalin's era successfully maintained their legitimacy against Barak's popularity. Barak, who had some of Khrushchev's talents for folksy fraternization with the masses, lost. His relative popularity proved of no avail in a clash with the unpopular and stern Novotny who proved able to maintain his direct access to both the Russians and the Party apparatus.

### THE GENERATION CHANGE

The newly elected Central Committee of the Party, although largely composed of Novotny's henchmen, reflects only one new feature: the generation change.<sup>10</sup> Younger men and women have begun to reach the top echelons of the Party. Out of 116 members of the Central Committee only 47 had been Party members prior to the Red Army's entry into Czechoslovakia in 1945; the rest (73) joined between 1947 and 1950.

What are the real outlook, goals and ambitions of Czechoslovakia's young generation in general, and Communist youth in particular? What would be their loyalty and behavior under stress or during a crisis? One can only speculate. Czechoslovak youth matured in a period when service to the Party could no longer result in "martyrdom" at the hands of capitalist oppressors. The things to dread were Stalinist terror and cruel punishment for any deviation. The thing to desire was not a revolutionary fight on a barricade but a government or Party job, including junkets, limousines, week-end cottages and other privileges enjoyed by the Party faithful. Thus communism has ceased to be a matter of faith. It has become a profession. Among

the young Communists, have opportunism and vested interests replaced the original vision or has there appeared a spark of a new reformation? Nobody can be certain.

The older Communist generation seems to realize the system's major failure, inability to produce a new generation of true believers. The younger generation appears politically apathetic, unsatisfied and grumbling while mechanically executing prescribed Party rituals.

Clearly, such a description applies even more generally and emphatically to the majority of the Czechoslovak youth which has not even bothered to apply for Party membership.

The days of our young are excessively penetrated by the stereotypes and haste of our way of life, that of the older generations [Marie Solleova writes in a Prague literary magazine]. Even their free time is thoroughly organized. Everything has its direction and sense. Nothing is romantic. Everything has been previously thought out by others. Man is rarely alone. They do not want me, says a young man, to have some sense for "nonsense. . . ." And then, nothing is ever forgotten. The system of personal files [from cradle to grave] guarantees that nothing from your life may ever be erased. The opportunity to experiment with one's own life is minimal. And the result? Man is too much a soldier in a rank and not enough an independent and creative individual.<sup>11</sup>

This truly astonishing description of the Orwellian way of life of Czechoslovak youth ("Man is Rarely Alone!"), written by a Communist and printed in a Communist magazine, seems to suggest that some future ferment may come. Or will opportunistic pursuit of careers, search for comfortable security, and enjoyment of marginal privileges—all results of modern totalitarianism—prevail in the future as they did in present generations?

On the surface, then, very little if anything has really changed in Czechoslovakia in the early 1960's. And yet the atmosphere is no longer the same. What has, however, changed and is still changing is the world outside Czechoslovakia, where behind a seemingly impenetrable Iron Curtain, the Communist leaders have lived, have maintained

<sup>10</sup> One-third of the full members of the Central Committee and one-half of the candidates are new. Out of 30 members of the Party Control and Audit Commission only five from the old Commission have been retained.

<sup>11</sup> *Literární Noviny*, Jan. 12, 1963.

their power, and in the process, have aged considerably.

While still apparently firmly in the saddle and enjoying Soviet support, the leadership has been shaken not by internal developments, but by the international situation: by the Cuban crisis leading to partial Soviet withdrawal and Khrushchev's recognition that "the confrontation in the Caribbean has shown once more that imperialism cannot as yet be considered a weak old man who merely threatens but lacks strength to act"; by the deflation of the Soviet claim of absolute rocket supremacy;<sup>12</sup> by the subsequent detente which in December, 1962, made the official delegate of the United States Communist Party, H. Winston, proclaim to the Communist congress at Prague that "Kennedy was not a new Roosevelt but neither was he a right winger nor fascist"; by the Sino-Indian

conflict in the framework of the Sino-Soviet dispute which finally led the Czechoslovak Communist leaders to compare the Albanian Communists to Hitler and Goebbels because they had dared to speak of Munich in connection with the solution of the Cuban crisis.<sup>13</sup>

The regime appears much less confident than it was before Cuba and the Sino-Soviet conflict. Having reflected in the past some of Moscow's self-confidence it now mirrors the uncertainties of its guide and master. It seems to be more aware that it presides over a society which finds itself in a moral, political and economic crisis. There are serious economic difficulties which seem to be beyond the regime's capacity to solve despite its claim that the Communist system, unlike capitalism, does not know any economic crises. And there is the big question mark for the future: the outlook of the young generation which is so flimsily committed to communism.

The gloom of the regime is however, matched by the gloom of its opponents who seem to conclude that no change for the better in East Central Europe is possible without Soviet assent.

Thus, a paradoxical situation has developed: for exactly opposite reasons, both the Communists and the anti-Communists derive a considerable comfort from the rumors of a possible Soviet-American detente.<sup>14</sup> In this context, the concept of the United States and the Soviet Union ganging up against China seems also strangely popular.

(Continued on page 309)

<sup>12</sup> Four days before the Soviet announcement that Soviet missiles would be withdrawn, the Communist press published the following story: "It is generally known that there are no missile bases on Cuba. And none is being built. Unlike the United States which trails behind the Soviet Union in the rocket techniques, the U.S.S.R. simply does not need to place its missiles on other nations' territories." The American accusation was then labelled "a soap bubble which would be pierced by its contact with generally known facts." (*Rudé Právo*, October 24, 1962).

<sup>13</sup> "If somebody has the right to speak about Munich, than it is, above all, Czechoslovakia," proclaimed one of the top leaders of the Party, Vladimir Koucky, at the Party Congress, in the presence of the Chinese delegate. "We know what Munich means. And we have also learnt that the Soviet policy has always been and presently is anti-Munichism incarnate. The [Albanian and Chinese] argument [according to which the Caribbean Munich has not saved but threatened peace] is morally so low that it reminds us of Hitler's and Goebbels' manners." (*Rudé Právo*, December 7, 1962.) The contrast between calling President Kennedy a "non-right-winger and non-fascist" and comparing Albanian Communist leaders openly to Hitler and Goebbels must have been from the standpoint of some Czechoslovak Communists highly confusing.

<sup>14</sup> *Literární Noviny*, December 22, 1962, published an editorial "Optimism and Phantasy" by Josef Rybak in which it says: "You know what I particularly liked reading today? That article in *Rudé Právo* which describes the U.S. missile on its way to Venus and the Soviet one which is supposed to reach Mars. Such objective calm writing which recognizes the skill on both sides appeals greatly to me. . . . If only America and the Soviet Union were to agree, no more wars would be possible. The progress in everything everywhere would be fantastic."

Prior to his coming to the U.S. in 1948, Ivo D. Duchacek was a member of the Czechoslovak Parliament and chairman of its Foreign Affairs Committee, 1945-1948. Before joining the faculty at City College, he taught and served as research consultant at Yale University from 1949 to 1953. Author of several studies on communism and American foreign policy in East Central Europe, Professor Duchacek has lectured at U.S. Army and Air War Colleges. In collaboration with K. W. Thompson he is also author of *Conflict and Cooperation Among Nations* (1960).

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*For Bulgaria, "it seems that the tensions of the 1960's are to be found primarily in the economic field." This author points out that "the crisis in agriculture is acute. . . . Agricultural stagnancy is proving a drag on over-all economic growth."*

## Bulgaria under Soviet Leadership

By L. A. D. DELLIN

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BULGARIA'S CURRENT history reveals an excessive subservience to the Soviets and a retarded process of more nominal than real de-Stalinization. This is explained partly by the history of the Bulgarian Communist party which has always been unusually close to the Soviet party, with many Bulgarian Communists gaining prominent positions in the COMINTERN (most notably Georgi Dimitrov as its secretary general).

However, the most plausible explanation of the post-war relationship is the fact that the Bulgarian Communists came to power and are maintained in power by merit of the Soviet Union. The pre-war Party membership never exceeded 30,000 and Bulgaria's pronouncedly egalitarian society based on small peasant landholdings did not offer much fertile ground. The seizure of power itself, on September 9, 1944, was made possible only by the unexpected Soviet declaration of war (in the midst of Bulgarian armistice negotiations with the Western Allies) and by the immediate entry of the Red Army, withdrawn only after the *Gleichschaltung* was assured.

The tradition of violence of Bulgarian communism, influenced by Balkan and Bulgarian political history as well as by Stalin's methods, must also be considered. Stalinization occurred much more rapidly and drastically than elsewhere in Communist Eastern Europe. The immediate wholesale liquidation of actual and potential enemies and the renewed terror of 1945-1947, when opposition parties were tolerated and polled a surprising one-third of the vote in spite of adversities, ended in Nikola Petkov's hanging and the elimination of any identifiable anti-Communist group. In retrospect it is understandable why Bulgarians have been less prone to react to Communist rule and why national leadership seems wanting.

The purges within the Party which started with Tito's excommunication and had a new spurt in the wake of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign and the Soviet-Chinese dispute, provide still another reason for the colorless complexion of Bulgaria's present-day leadership.<sup>1</sup> The simple truth of the matter is that few men of stature, able or willing to offer any meaningful opposition to the Soviet leadership, have been kept alive or in power. First, Stalin's suspicion of "native-grown" Communists (as a result of Tito's defection,) sent Traicho Kostov, the most obvious successor of Dimitrov, to the gallows and installed the Moscow-trained Vulko Chervenkov as Bulgaria's "little Stalin." During

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<sup>1</sup> At the 8th Party Congress these excesses were termed "medieval inquisitions." Yugov was blamed for Kostov's frame-up (although at the time he was demoted for "lack of vigilance" with regard to Kostov) and Chervenkov accused of "destroying morally and thus causing the death" of V. Poptomov, former foreign minister, and A. Zhdanov, known painter. No mention was made of the excesses against non-Communists. (Proceedings of the Congress in *Otechestven Front*, November 6-17, 1962).

Chervenkov's reign (1950-1954) many other leading "natives" were purged and about 100,000 Party members (out of a total of 460,000) were officially expelled.

Still Chervenkov not only carried the stick but also had enjoyed prestige as ideologist and organizer since the days of the COMINTERN. Therefore his removal was gradual and anticlimactic. It leaves a vacuum in the Party leadership, especially after the purges of other "strong men" like Chankov (once deemed as most likely successor to Chervenkov but purged in 1957), Yugov (police minister during the bloodiest years, premier from 1956 until his purge in 1962), or the Terpeshev-Panov group (purged in 1957) which the mediocrity of the present leadership, headed by Todor Zhivkov, cannot fill. It is, indeed, ironic that the once influential Bulgarian voice in COMINTERN deliberations has been silenced, much more by abdication than by coercion, and that the Bulgarian party has become an atrophic appendage of the Soviet party.

In view of this background it should not be surprising that no moves to assert independence from Moscow were noticeable in the top leadership even when many opportunities offered themselves after Stalin's death. In fact it seems that Soviet leadership pushed Bulgarian subordinates toward internal relaxation, economic concessions, and foreign policy overtures much against the latters' wishes.

### RISE OF ZHIVKOV

The period 1953-1957 saw an abatement in open police terror and economic hardships. It witnessed the replacement of Chervenkov as first secretary by his native-grown protégé Zhivkov (1954) and as Premier by Yugov after the "historic" April, 1956,

<sup>2</sup> The lack of drastic changes is now ascribed to the fact that "the situation in the Party and leadership was then such that this question [of punishing the guilty] would have created serious difficulties." *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> The tragic was mixed with the comic, such as blaming Chervenkov for hard as well as soft-line policies or incriminating Yugov for anti-Party activities since his "illegal pre-1944 period" and for "gross incompetence" during his six years as Premier.

Plenum exposed him in rather mild language for having fostered the "harmful personality cult." Many natives reappeared in leading positions but the leadership showed no intention to go much farther in the direction of "liberalization," in spite or because of widespread restlessness culminating in the Writers Union during the tense and hopeful months of 1956.<sup>2</sup>

The period after 1957 witnessed the gradual consolidation of Zhivkov's position. Zhivkov had apparently become Khrushchev's choice. (This necessitated the elimination of all strong Party men and centrifugal forces, a difficult task.) It was Khrushchev's decision to renew his denunciations of Stalin and to neutralize Stalinism in anti-Mao fashion which led the November, 1961, Plenum to "draw lessons" from the Soviet party congress and at long last to drop Chervenkov from the government as well as from the Politburo. However, the accusations against him were again watered down and de-Stalinization restricted to meaningless changes in place names. Concurrently, as a reminder that "revisionism" was no less of a crime, the Terpeshev group was bitterly chastised.

Zhivkov's final triumph came only at the curiously postponed eighth Party Congress of November, 1962, which resembled the happenings at the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Party six years earlier. Zhivkov and his men exposed for the first time in detail the excesses and errors during the time of the "personality cult"; they put the blame for this on Chervenkov, who was expelled from the Party ranks altogether and quite unexpectedly, on Premier Yugov and five other former police chiefs, all of whom were dropped from the Central Committee and government positions. At long last Kostov was posthumously restored to full membership and even decorated and 6,000 political prisoners, mostly Communists, were released. It was obvious that some of the accusations were motivated by personal revenge and by the desire to find scapegoats for Zhivkov's own role before 1956 and especially for his economic failures during the "great leap forward" experiment of 1959.<sup>3</sup>



Zhivkov's victory was reflected in the assured majority on the nine-man Politburo, the enlarged Central Committee and Council of Ministers as well as his concurrent assumption of the premiership on November 19, and the reshuffling of the Party and government organization along Khrushchev's new lines.

It took ten years of intra-Party struggle to get rid of Chervenkov, with Yugov as a bonus, but de-Stalinization has not shown thus far any lesser reliance on the police and the Soviet Union or any genuine attempt to improve the economic lot of the people in a systematic way.

The present situation in the Party leadership suggests relative calm and unity, but also mediocrity—the rule of the Bulgarian *apparatchiki*, obediently devoted to Khrushchev. Although bickering for position is likely to continue, there is no faction suggesting diversity, let alone an independent course. The decimated Kostovites, closest to Titoism, and the natives of the Terpeshev and possibly Chankov wing, calling for deemphasis on heavy industry, are out of power. The Yugovites had the strongest man after Chervenkov but their rivalry with the Zhivkov core involved more personality than policy.

As for Chervenkov and his supporters who would have represented most accurately the over-all Stalinist complexion of the Party were it not for Khrushchev, their quarrel is with Khrushchev's brand of communism and not with Soviet supremacy. It is true that Chervenkov eyed for a while the Chinese communes (so did Zhivkov who also borrowed the "great leap forward" slogan). However, this was not meant as an anti-Soviet act, rather as an expression of solidarity with the hard-line Soviet leaders. Thus, while Chinese methods seem attractive, China as a center of world communism does not and another Albania is not likely.

<sup>4</sup> Zhivkov admitted the existence of "certain fridity between leaders and masses" and accused Party members for that. He introduced changes in the Party statute and called for increased Party control, aping Khrushchev. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Sources: Zhivkov's Report (*Ibid.*), 1961 *Statisticheski Godishnik*, Sofia, 1961, and U.N. publications, especially the *Economic Survey of Europe*, 1960 and 1961.

This leaves the now undisputed Zhivkovite bureaucrats of the post-revolutionary generation (all Zhivkovites on the Politburo are in their 40's and Zhivkov himself is 52) who have at least the vested support of the rank-and-file. This corrupt, anti-national characteristic of applied Bulgarian communism is the major reason for the estrangement of the Party from the masses. The clear distinction between "ours" and "theirs" in every day reference is perhaps more pronounced in Bulgaria than elsewhere. Party membership is now 528,746 (an increase of 44,419 over 1958) but the greatest relative increase is in bureaucrats. The share of young people has dropped from 20 to 15 per cent, with village youth admissions practically discontinued, and with women composing 17 per cent altogether; this is an indication of an apathetic youth, an unreceptive family, and a hostile peasantry (still two-thirds of the population). No enthusiasm is evident in a frustrated intelligentsia and an overstrained industrial force.

Thus, there is apparent unity and political stability, more than in the 1950's, but they are less the result of Communist reformation than of common interests of the "new class," which shows little desire to share its Soviet-given power and benefits with the masses but whose aversion it cannot mitigate otherwise. Add to this the tight controls over society as well as Western helplessness and it will be obvious that enforced Communist strength in Bulgaria is communism's weakness as well.<sup>4</sup>

The drive of Communist economic policies has also been the "Soviet model," i.e., autarky-like industrialization with emphasis on heavy industry, financed primarily by a collectivized peasantry and motivated substantially by concomitant socio-political goals. The result is a deepening imbalance between industrial capacity and its domestic resource base, a serious neglect of light industry, and a setback in agriculture which cannot feed adequately either the agricultural industries or the growing urbanized population so that imports of wheat and even pork and beef are occasionally needed.

The following major facts, achievements, and problems substantiate these conclusions:<sup>5</sup>

1) There is a quantitatively impressive, although substantially inflated and incorrectly weighted, growth in national income and especially in industrial output and employment to the effect that now the ratio of industrial to agricultural output is reported 73:27 against 25:75 in 1939, and capital to consumer goods output about 50:50 (77:23 in favor of the latter in 1939). However, judging on the basis of employment figures, over two-thirds of the labor force is still agricultural and food processing remains the industrial branch with the largest single employment and the highest share in total industrial output, although its relative position has declined. This places the Communist claims in better perspective.

2) The concentration on heavy industry is clear from the fact that three-fourths of the overriding industrial investment has always gone into it. Annual output of key commodities has increased greatly over pre-war levels and reached in 1962 about 20 million tons of coal, 600,000 tons of iron ore, 6 billion kwh of electric power, 1.9 million tons of cement, 400,000 tons of steel, and 325,000 tons of rolled products. The iron and steel industry is practically a Communist creation (as is engineering); its output is claimed to be about 30 per cent of total industrial production.

Most of the large new plants are, however, heavily subsidized (the integrated Lenin Works as much as one fourth of current production) and work substantially for exports. For example, 90 per cent of current output of the Battery Plant, over half of that of the Karl Marx Soda Plant and of the Pieck Cement Plant, as well as of the Dimitrov Shipping Yards, go abroad.

On balance, Bulgaria remains relatively backward and inefficient in heavy industry and per capita production of steel and cement has been estimated by the United Nations at about one-fourth of the West European aver-

age and that of electricity, one-fourth of the East European level. In view of this and the human and material sacrifice involved one must express serious doubts as to the merits of the Communist experiment.<sup>6</sup>

3) As heavy industrial capacity increases so does the gap between capacity and the domestic resource base. Fuel and power resources are limited and of poor quality; coal reserves are about 7 billion tons, 90 per cent of which is lignite and brown coal, so that coking coal is practically nonexistent; petroleum and natural gas, discovered only recently, seem insignificant (1961 oil output was 210,000 tons); water potential would be promising were it not for climatic and topographic adversities and high cost; and uranium of unknown quantity and quality is exploited by the Soviets.

Iron ore is also deficient and only the recent discovery of the Kremikovtsi deposits (estimated at about 250 million tons) promises to meet and exceed domestic requirements. Yet these 32 per cent iron-content reserves are located 100 meters below the rock cover and deep into the underground waters, so that costly drainage is needed. Lead, zinc and copper are more abundant but the depletion of the better ores requires enrichment and raises cost. Chemical raw materials of the inorganic type are satisfactory, but fertilizer minerals are scarce.

In spite of these clearly inadequate resources, their output is being desperately stepped up. Still the country must rely on substantial imports. Thus, almost all the coke and petroleum, one-half the iron ore, and over one-half the steel are imported.

The new approach is to concentrate as much as 43 per cent of all investment on five "key" targets, in order to alleviate this dependency: the Kremikovtsi Iron and Steel Works, the Oil Refinery near Burgas, the Maritsa East Coal Mines and Thermal Power Plant, the Nitrogen Fertilizer Plant near St. Zagora, and the Medet Copper Ore Combine. How successful these ventures will be is hard to tell, but many of the projects have already run into delays and the price may turn out to be prohibitive.

<sup>6</sup> Zhivkov termed industry "inefficient" and engineering "backward" (*Ibid.*), and subsequent reports spoke of "no need to develop all branches of heavy industry, due to our relatively low level of industrial development" (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, January 15, 1963).

4) Collectivization of agriculture (which to the small land-owning Bulgarian peasant meant expropriation and loss of freedom) was pushed with every possible means and resulted in a preponderance of the kolkhoz-type farms (TKZS) as early as 1952; after a new spurt in 1958–1959, only one to two per cent of the farmland is outside the “socialist” (state and collective farm) sector.

Since 1953, and especially in 1957 and 1961–1962, a set of urgently needed correctives was introduced in order to improve the dismal lot of the peasant and give him some incentive to increase the sagging farm output. Correctives included the replacement of the confiscatory compulsory deliveries by purchasing agreements at higher uniform procurement prices, lower taxes and prices of farm-purchased goods, social security benefits, and greater incentives for livestock raising. This undoubtedly bettered the terms of trade of the peasantry but their relative position is still unfavorable and their purchasing power is low.

Agricultural performance reflects this unhealthy situation. Total crop output was estimated by United Nations specialists for the record 1957–1959 period some 30 per cent higher than before the war (Zhivkov speaks about a 70 per cent increase in gross agricultural output over an undefined “pre-war average” in value terms) but average, not to speak of per capita yields (population increased by about one-fourth since before the war) have not advanced over-all and production actually declined during the 1960’s, due partly to poor weather. The livestock sector is in a worse position as total number of cattle and sheep differ little from 22 years

ago (cattle—1.7 million in 1961, 1.8 in 1939; sheep—9.6 versus 10.2 million) and only hog and poultry numbers have increased. The officially recognized reason is the serious fodder shortage.

This stagnation is explained partly by the low priority given agriculture (the share of investment has fluctuated widely, hitting a low of 1.7 per cent in 1950 and a high of 16 per cent in 1956, then steadying in the 1960’s around 10–12 per cent, a reported 2.5 times increase over 1956) but also poor management and lack of incentive, and especially the resentful attitude of the peasants. An argument to support this contention is the almost miraculous performance of the “acre-and-a-cow” private plot which the collective members work on their own. Occupying less than 10 per cent of the land these plots produce 40 per cent of the livestock and a higher ratio (3 to 4 times) of agricultural output to farm land, including higher per acre crop production, than the socialized sector; this in spite of the complete lack of machinery and other handicaps.

Averse to private plots in principle and committed to their eventual elimination, the Communists cannot seemingly do without them. This is one reason for their qualified support of this last remnant of private enterprise in February, 1963. But the Communists continue to work at cross-purposes, favoring the capital deficient mammoth-scale units (Bulgarian collectives, 43,000 decares on the average, are the largest farms in Europe but use meager non-labor inputs, 1,100 decares per 15-hp tractor, 3.2 kg. of pure-content fertilizer per decare, and about 15 per cent of the arable land under irrigation) while holding the labor-intensive private plots to an uneconomical midget size.

With no more land available, the crisis in agriculture is acute. There is no drastic remedy in sight, but agricultural stagnancy is proving a drag on over-all economic growth.<sup>7</sup>

5) Some rationality was introduced as a result of COMECON specialization which assigns to Bulgaria priority in some more viable branches such as non-ferrous metals, light engineering, and some chemicals as well

<sup>7</sup> Zhivkov: “Livestock production is unable to meet the needs of the people and industry . . . and fodder lags far behind livestock growth.” He called grain output “our number one problem” and warned: “On the rapid increase of our agricultural production depends to a great degree the overcoming of the difficulties of our economic development.” *Ibid.*

The decree (*Durzhaven Vestnik*, February 8, 1963) calls for collective farm assistance and for distribution of unclaimed wasteland to private plot workers and permits 2 or 3 households to own one ox-drawn cart, animals excluded, but forbids the growing of anything but fodder crops for the market.

as a re-emphasis on food-processing, textiles, and agriculture, most notably viticulture, horticulture, and tobacco growing, as well as tourism. Yet the main purpose is to step up exports and the main emphasis remains on heavy industry. Reliance on "selfless Soviet aid," placed as high as 1.2 billion rubles between 1947 and 1961, on closer scrutiny seems to consist almost exclusively of credits to bolster branches which need Soviet deliveries or produce for exports for the Soviet Union. It most likely includes Soviet commercial exports, and Bulgarian contributions are wholly disregarded.

Moreover, as a result of overpriced Soviet exports to and underpriced Soviet imports from Bulgaria, the country has been found the heaviest loser of all other satellites because of these price discriminations.<sup>8</sup> Be that as it may, Soviet aid must be strongly deflated as to magnitude and purpose and requires burdensome Bulgarian deliveries to repay the loans. This is evidenced also by the projected 7-8 fold increase in foreign trade turnover by 1980 (80 per cent is now with the Bloc and over 50 per cent with the Soviet Union alone), the highest increase of any Communist country.

6) As a result of Communist economic policy, living standards are deemed exceedingly low, although improvements in many fields have occurred since 1953. Zhivkov claimed that from 1961 to 1956 real annual incomes per capita increased 30 per cent for workers and employees and 59 per cent, for peasants, reaching respectively 536 and 415 leva (\$450 and \$350, at the inflated official exchange rate). Other statistics give 70 leva (\$60) as the average monthly salary and minimum wages and pensions as half as much,

<sup>8</sup> Cf. H. Menderhausen in *The Review of Economic and Statistics*, May, 1959, and May, 1960, and especially A. Kutt in *East Europe*, May, 1962, who finds 1955-1960 overpricing of Soviet exports by 44.6 per cent and underpricing of Bulgarian exports by 36.4 per cent. F. D. Holzman in *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, May, 1962, disagrees on the basis of his "customs union" approach.

<sup>9</sup> Zhivkov conceded that the consumer goods industries "do not meet domestic needs" and cited specifically shortages in fabrics, shoes, and children's and teenagers' clothing. (*Ibid.*)

which is not too impressive. A look at everyday life reveals drabness and privations, including rationing of some basic foods, an unknown experience in pre-war times. Official statistics give the following 1960 figures of annual per capita production of selected items: meat products—25 kg.; milk—124 liters; eggs—84 units; sugar—17 kg.; shoes—1.5 pair; and a blank for living space. The July, 1962, increase in animal products' prices (25 per cent on the average) created open unrest to such an extent that the government had to decree the deportation of "rumor spreaders" and "parasites."

Thus, it seems that the tensions of the 1960's are to be found primarily in the economic field; per capita consumption targets for 1980, when "the foundations of communism" will be laid, are hardly those of an affluent society by any standard.<sup>9</sup>

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

It would be superfluous to expand much on Bulgaria's foreign relations as they reflect submission to Soviet leadership, "peaceful co-existence" and all. "Bulgarian-Soviet friendship" remains, in Zhivkov's words, "the sun and air of our people." Only the affinity for "hard-line" communism and the historic antagonism with the Balkan neighbors, including the squabbles with Tito's "revisionist" Yugoslavia, soften accusations against "dogmatism" (China and even Albania), and pats for Tito. Bulgaria, unlike most other Bloc countries, has not severed relations with Albania, possibly to serve the Soviets in any future contingency.

Relations with Yugoslavia are still marred by Serbo-Bulgarian enmity over Macedonia as well as by ideological differences but the years of bitter propaganda warfare seem ended as a result of Khrushchev's reconciliation with Tito. In spite of occasional flare-ups, state relations are correct, trade is normalized, and Party animosities are submerged, although "revisionism" is still a favorite target.

Relations with non-Communist neighbors are hostile (although joint Bulgarian-Yugoslav actions of the Stalin era are no longer



possible). Diplomatic relations with Greece were resumed as late as 1954, after a 13-year break, but Bulgarian unwillingness to settle war reparations to Greek satisfaction, plus the Macedonian dispute and other provocations, have thus far prevented the exchange of ambassadors or the resumption of trade and cultural ties. After the expulsion of 250,000 Turks in the early 1950's, relations with Turkey have remained cool. The Bulgarian leadership backed by Moscow tries to neutralize those two Nato allies by alternating threats with proposals for de-militarization of the Balkan area.

Due to its geographic proximity and less objectionable small size Bulgaria is assigned a more active role in the economic penetration of the uncommitted Near and Middle Eastern countries than elsewhere.

### BULGARIA AND THE WEST

No deviations from the customary pattern are noteworthy in Bulgaria's relations with the West except perhaps for the current history of American-Bulgarian ties. Limited trade with Western Europe—less than 15 per cent of total Bulgarian turnover—is due largely to the unattractiveness of present-day surpluses and is expected to decline further as Common Market provisions enter into force, much to Bulgaria's concern.

The United States severed diplomatic relations with Bulgaria in February, 1950, when Chervenkov's government refused to withdraw charges of "conspiracy" against the United States Minister, implicating him in Kostov's trial. Relations were resumed in March, 1959, after repeated Bulgarian overtures and, more specifically, after Kostov's rehabilitation and assurances that American Legation personnel would not be molested.

<sup>10</sup> All Sofia dailies of March 28, 1949, commented in this vein and the regime even sent as Minister to Washington Dr. Peter Voutov, author of a textbook entitled *The Anglo-American Imperialists—The Most Vicious Enemies of the Bulgarian People* (1953) in which he had called President (then General) Eisenhower "one of the most outspoken warmongers . . . and gangsters" (p. 67).

<sup>11</sup> Shipkov's tortures were described in his affidavits reprinted in *Breakdown* (New York: National Committee for a Free Europe, 1951).

The Bulgarian regime greeted the resumption as a "new success . . . made possible by the correct policy and strength of the Socialist camp," did not mention at all that American conditions had to be met, and in general tried to convey the impression of an American retreat and Communist triumph.<sup>10</sup> Perhaps the United States should have insisted on the fuller airing of the background circumstances before the Bulgarian public as well and on prior settlement of outstanding or anticipated controversies, such as war claims, release of former Bulgarian employees of the Legation, or recognition of American citizenship for naturalized Bulgarians.

Bulgaria's admission to the United Nations in 1955 plus restored relations with the United States seem to have added to the regime's prestige internationally and caused misapprehension at home.

### CONCLUSION

The subsequent years brought American participation in the Plovdiv Fair with some harassment, insignificant travel and trade, a projected exchange of scholars, the detention of some 40 United States citizens, and a deadlock in war claims negotiations. The arrival of Mrs. Eugenie Anderson as United States Minister in the summer of 1962 showed fruits in that Michael Shipkov, one of the former Legation employees, was finally freed after 13 years in prison<sup>11</sup> and some more Bulgarians were permitted to visit relatives in the States. To what degree American representations are effective is hard to tell. Officially, the United States remains "enemy No. 1" of the regime, yet a source of hope—realistic or not—of the people.

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*"The Hungarian economy still suffers from the aftermath of the Revolution. Capital investments to further industrialization have been restricted by lack of credits." According to this authority, "Hungarian leaders have made it clear that increased investments in industry, the obligation to repay credits to the Soviet Union, and increased military expenditure at present prevent any significant rise in living standards."*

## Hungary Faces the Future

By FERENC A. VÁLI

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THERE WERE and are difficult times in the life of a nation when those in power . . . accept dependence, subordination, humiliating slavery—betraying the cause of national independence. . . . However, according to the lessons of history, these betrayals do not end with the destruction of the nation but with that of the traitors. . . ."<sup>1</sup> These words were written in 1955 not by a conservative nationalist but by the Communist Imre Nagy, one of the prime ministers in the 1956 Revolution, who was executed in 1958. There is much reason to believe that these words have not lost their significance for Hungary.

After nearly seven years, the memory of the fateful events of 1956<sup>2</sup> is still alive in everyone's mind, be he friend or foe of the regime. Internal and external policies are still, consciously or unconsciously, influenced by these events. Curiously enough, the regime finds itself compelled to keep these reminiscences alive by insisting on its own version of the events.

Among the various, often contradictory, explanations presented by the regime of Party

leader and Prime Minister János Kádár, the normal story is that the Western imperialists, exploiting the discontent created by the "cult of personality" under the Hungarian Stalinist Matyas Rákosi, fostered the revolt; the workers, with Soviet assistance, put down this "counter-revolution." Another version—for students of the Party Academy—is that the revolution was due to a "premature adaptation of Soviet experiences in a different situation and in a different period"; the moral drawn is that the lessons of the pre-revolutionary period must be learned.

Of course, every adult in Hungary knows that the revolt was spontaneous, was fought by students and workers, and was eventually suppressed singlehandedly by the Soviet Army; this Army re-installed a Soviet-controlled Communist regime, headed by Kádár. This stigma of the present regime's origin is the government's greatest political and psychological hurdle; it is still an obstacle on the road toward a normalization of the internal and external relations of the regime.

During the last two years all-out attempts have been made by the Kádár government to gain popular sympathy, to narrow the yawning gap between the regime and the people at large. In a speech before the People's Patriotic Front in December, 1961, Kádár reversed Rákosi's idea ("who is not

<sup>1</sup> Imre Nagy *On Communism*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957, p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> For the causes and events of the 1956 Revolution see: Ferenc A. Váli, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary—Nationalism Versus Communism*, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1961.

with us, is against us”) by declaring that “who is not against us, is with us.” In March, 1962, he said that there are many different viewpoints in Hungary which do not prevent people from living peacefully and working honestly; the only enemies are those who try to undermine the workers’ power. The rest realize that the regime is better for them than were earlier governments. He suggested that the Communists’ mistakes are more harmful than the acts of the class enemy.

The reasons that induced Kádár to try to placate public sentiment are manifold. The ruling Party clique, in agreement with the Soviet leadership, must have come to the conclusion that five or six years after the Revolution they could afford the relaxation of the most stringent dictatorial methods without endangering the stability of the regime. Greater elbow-room for writers, participation of non-Party experts in leading economic positions, cessation of discrimination against “class enemies,” and somewhat improved living conditions might gain popular support for the regime. These would also pave the way for a normalization of those international relations which have suffered under the impact of Soviet military intervention. Having violently antagonized workers, intellectuals, and more recently, the peasantry, (by the forced collectivization), the regime wishes to regain the confidence of at least some segments of the two former groups. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev may also have urged upon the Hungarian leaders that they “popularize” their rule in order to forestall the necessity of another bolstering of communism in Hungary.

It appears that Kádár and his closer associates want to achieve a somewhat Gomulka-like approach to popular cooperation. But the Polish precedent lacks validity for Hungary: Wladyslaw Gomulka returned to become a Party and national leader by an autochthonous Polish action, against the will of Moscow. Kádár was forced on the Hungarian people by the Soviet Army against the will of the Hungarian nation. Furthermore, Gomulka can easily persuade the Poles that Poland’s national existence depends essentially

on Soviet support against German claims to Poland’s western territories and, consequently, on the maintenance of the present regime. No such danger threatens Hungary from the Germans, at least nothing comparable to the reality of Soviet domination.

The unsavory origins of the Kádár regime and the hatred and contempt felt against Kádár himself by the masses make a genuine rapprochement with large segments of the people most unlikely unless very large concessions are made to national sentiment, concessions incompatible with Soviet interest and prestige—including the replacement of Kádár himself.

Naturally, since people want to live and, as far as possible, enjoy living, Kádár’s controlled liberalization is accepted with satisfaction by all who gain by it. Such relaxation increases the number of cautious opportunists; it also induces people to think in less violent terms of their rulers and to express some limited appreciation of existing conditions. All this, however, does not necessarily mean that the people at large have given up their mental reservations or that they endorse or approve of the regime. It is significant that all these relaxations—however restricted they are—are ascribed to the revolution itself rather than to the magnanimity of the regime. It should also be noted that most of these “concessions” are under heavy fire from some leftist elements within the ruling Communist party.

## RECENT TRENDS

Intraparty conflicts—a heritage of the events of 1956—have been increased by the Sino-Soviet rift. Prior to the twenty-second Soviet Party Congress, condemnations and purges were directed primarily against “revisionists.” But since the end of 1961, de-Stalinization—alongside the “popularization campaign”—has become the order of the day. The first ostensible anti-Stalinist action was the renaming of streets and of the town named after Stalin. Statues of Stalin were destroyed during the revolutionary days of 1956. In this respect, Kádár’s comments made before the workers of Csepel are to be

noted: those who overthrew the big Stalin statue in Budapest are not to be forgiven; they did so not because they hated Stalin but because they hated communism.

The main onslaught against former Stalinists began in August, 1962, and ended before the eighth Party Congress in November, 1962. Twenty-five persons were expelled from the Party, including Rákosi (who lives in the Soviet Union), his successor, Gerö, who had first asked for Soviet military intervention in October, 1956, Judge Olti, who presided over many rigged trials (including that of Cardinal Mindszenty), and a number of security police officers. Others expelled were accused of organizing "factions."

A number of high Party dignitaries were subsequently replaced or reduced in stature; the most important case seems to be the removal of Marosán, a Party secretary renowned for his vulgar speeches and coarse attacks against intellectuals. Dögei, a former Minister of Agriculture and Ambassador to Peking, had earlier been ousted from the Party. The official report submitted on behalf of the Party leadership by Kádár to the eighth Congress condemned Stalinism, strongly censured those responsible for past illegalities and abuses, mostly committed against fellow Party members. This report, in a way, contained an all-out condemnation of the Stalinist era in Hungary, a period when "Rákosi and his clique" grabbed and misused all the power of the Party and of the state.

Of course, the answer to the question: who is a Stalinist, is a rather arbitrary one. Kádár, before his imprisonment, happened himself to be Minister of the Interior in 1949-1950, the heyday of Stalinism. There is a certain similarity in the positions of Khrushchev and Kádár. Both were beneficiaries of the Stalinist era and shared in Stalinist excesses; but now both decide who is a Stalinist and who is not.

<sup>3</sup> From a speech by Politburo member Nemes before the Party Academy reported in *Társadalmi Szemle*, Feb., 1962.

<sup>4</sup> Pál Sándor in the June, 1961, issue of *Felsőoktatásügyi Szemle*.

Kádár's role is closely linked with Khrushchev's leadership; in fact, he is the Soviet leader's most loyal retainer among the satellite leaders and enthusiastically joined Khrushchev's bandwagon against the Chinese and the Albanians. It is well-known that some of the purged Party members had formed something like a pro-Chinese faction. In January, 1962, the theoretical Party journal gave the following high-level interpretation of the Sino-Soviet conflict:

The Soviet doctrine of Communism is a mature one whereas the Chinese is still immature, replete with ideas which might directly endanger the victory of the doctrine itself. The Chinese opinions must be weeded out from the consciousness of the Hungarian Communists.<sup>3</sup>

Broadsides against Stalinists, dogmatists and leftists have not entirely replaced attacks against "revisionists." The Party was eager to remind its members that the twenty-second Soviet Party Congress, while emphasizing the dangers of the "personality cult," did not justify or acquit revisionism. The Party is also aware of the fact that revisionism is often a cloak to cover all-out anti-Communist or anti-Soviet attitudes, even of official Party members. A prominent Party theoretician drew attention to the danger of nationalism "which was the basic platform and connecting link between the various counterrevolutionary forces from the revisionists and social democrats through to the fascists. . . ."<sup>4</sup>

In September, 1961, Kádár again took over the post of Prime Minister which he had relinquished in January, 1958. Next to Khrushchev he is the only Soviet bloc leader who combines the post of First Party Secretary with that of the Premier. His two leading associates are Gyula Kállai, Deputy Prime Minister, and Béla Biszku, Minister of the Interior until 1961 and now one of the leading Party Secretaries under Kádár. One of them is likely to succeed Kádár. In February, 1962, a reshuffle of junior ministers took place; some technically more competent persons replaced older ones, mostly of a Stalinist type. This was another gesture for better popular understanding.

Nevertheless, the locus of real power still



rests—not with the Party Congress or Central Committee, nor with the National Assembly—but with the leading Party clique, the Politburo, where most of the members are friends or creatures of Kádár. Ultimately, of course, though less patently now than in the first years after the suppression of the Revolution, control of Hungarian affairs rests with the Kremlin.

No significant change has taken place in the numbers of Soviet armed forces in Hungary since the end of 1957, when the swollen army of occupation was reduced to four divisions, some anti-aircraft personnel and ancillary units. Shortly after the revolution, Kádár had promised that all Soviet troops would be withdrawn; later he only hinted at such a possibility. In the past two years, all rumors of such a pull out have ceased; there can be no doubt that the presence of Soviet forces must be considered a permanent feature of Hungarian life.

The Hungarian Army, reduced in numbers and armaments after the revolution, is now being again strengthened, its morale is being boosted, it has received new armament. The military budget, as low as 2 billion forint (about \$200 million) in 1957 and 1958, has reached a peak of 7.4 billion forint (about \$740 million) in 1962.

In addition to the People's Army, the government disposes of armed detachments to deal with internal disturbances: the Domestic Security Forces (the military arm of the Security Police), the Workers' Militia and the Police. The Security Police (formerly A.V.O. or A.V.H.) is now administratively part of the ordinary police but its functions and powers are unchanged. Its activity, however, is more restrained and discreet than in Rákosi's time or in the years immediately following the revolution. The Party leadership now exercises full control over the Security Police (as in the Soviet Union) and the retribution meted out against former A.V.H. officers serves as a warning for those who are now in command.

The much heralded amnesty of political prisoners in April, 1960, proved less broad

than anticipated. Another amnesty, officially announced on March 21, 1963, led to the release of prominent persons convicted for revolutionary or post-revolutionary activities, among them István Bibó. The number of political prisoners and of persons under special police surveillance has thus been reduced. But those sentenced for treason or espionage, or freedom fighters convicted for homicide and other common crimes will still remain in jail.

The regime, during the last two years, has somewhat liberalized its censorship of the press, of periodicals and of the theatre. Thus, sometimes surprisingly, daring articles are published, satire flourishes on the stage deriding certain aspects of the regime. Writers of real talent, who for years had lived in "spiritual emigration" and refused to praise the regime, restricting their work to translations or the re-editing of former works, now dare to publish again. Many of them, compelled by economic necessity, write in allegorical terms, anxious not to incur the wrath of censorship; but, at the same time, they avoid writing anything that can be interpreted as approval of the regime. There are a number of opportunist writers willing to compromise.

Relations between the government and the churches, despite official declarations to the contrary, remain strained. Even the Catholic Church, unlike that of Poland, is at the mercy of the regime which tries to control it with the help of the so-called "peace priests" (rejected or excommunicated by the Vatican). A new wave of terror descended on the Catholic clergy during the winter of 1960–1961. In June, 1961, 12 priests and fellow "conspirators" were sentenced to long term imprisonments. The Primate of the Hungarian Catholic Church, Cardinal Mindszenty, continues to live under the protection of the American Legation in Budapest. Archbishop Grösz, the second ranking prelate, died in October, 1961. At present, all the archdiocesan posts and half the bishoprics are vacant; the nominees of Rome are unacceptable to the government, and the regime's candidates are refused by the Vatican. The vacant bishoprics and those where the in-

cumbents are in jail are administered by vicars general approved by the government.

### THE ECONOMY

The Hungarian economy still suffers from the aftermath of the revolution. Capital investments to further industrialization have been restricted by lack of credits. The Soviet Union, which pumped nearly \$300 million worth of credits and goods into the Hungarian economy in late 1956 and 1957, has stopped giving larger credits. Repayment of these loans has now begun.

The current Five Year Plan which will end by 1965 is said to be progressing well. Kádár announced to the 1962 Party Congress that industrial output overfulfilled the Plan in 1961 but production of consumer goods was four per cent below. Agriculture is, however, greatly lagging behind schedule; this circumstance is officially attributed to drought whereas, in fact, it is the result of forced collectivization.

Collectivization of agriculture was completed in early 1961. Pushed through with utmost ruthlessness, collectivization turned the peasants, until then a rather passive element, into an actively hostile segment of the population. Food shortages, endemic behind the Iron Curtain, were thereafter more stringently felt in Hungary; this former "granary of Europe" has to import grain products. The inefficiency and lack of productivity of agricultural collectives, largely due to sabotage and to the "go-slow" of collectivized farmers, was dramatically admitted in March, 1962, by the Minister of Agriculture who said that in 1961 collectives and state farms produced only 37 per cent of crops whereas still existing private plots produced 63 per cent of the total farm output.<sup>5</sup>

In 1959, Hungary's trade turnover with the Soviet Union represented around 30 per cent of her foreign trade. Another 30 per cent of imports and exports was carried on with other Communist countries. The remaining 40 per cent of foreign trade was with Western Europe and Afro-Asian countries.

The first trading partner of Hungary is the Soviet Union; the second Czechoslovakia; the third East Germany; but the fourth is, strangely enough, West Germany.

Anxiety is felt in Hungary, as in the rest of the East-Central European satellite area, because of the Common Market's marked success. Despite efforts to make the COMECON (Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation) a counterpart of the Common Market in the Communist orbit, Hungary and other satellite countries remain dependent on Western markets.

Hungarian leaders have made it clear that increased investments in industry, the obligation to repay credits to the Soviet Union, and increased military expenditure at present prevent any significant rise in living standards. Hungary will have to produce more, export more, and export in such a manner that she can buy the necessary raw materials for her industry and, at the same time, reduce her foreign indebtedness. Politically influenced imports (like Cuban sugar which Hungary resells at a loss), discriminating prices imposed by the Soviet Union, and aid to underprivileged countries largely impair developments achieved elsewhere by Hungary's precarious economy.

### HUNGARY'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION

Hungary's shattered international relations were gradually improved in the years following the Revolution. Under the protective hand of Khrushchev, Kádár has gained some stature in the Soviet-Communist bloc. Witness of this is the article which he was allowed to publish in *Pravda* on December 26, 1961, on the sensitive Soviet-Albanian (really Soviet-Chinese) issue. Previously, in 1960, Kádár accompanied the Soviet leader to New York and made a speech in the United Nations.

Hungary's position in the United Nations is of considerable importance to the regime for reasons of prestige. Ever since the Revolution, the Soviet Union and the Hungarian government have been condemned by the United Nations General Assembly; the former for the suppression of the revolt, the

<sup>5</sup> *The New York Times*, March 18, 1962.

latter because of violation of human rights and reluctance to allow free elections. The credentials of the Hungarian delegation have not been recognized though they have not been rejected. In 1958, former Assembly President, Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand, was named United Nations' representative on Hungary. Sir Leslie was, however, not admitted to Hungary, and neither Soviet or Hungarian delegations recognized his mandate. In December, 1961, the General Assembly again "deplored the continued disregard by the U.S.S.R. and the present Hungarian regime [*sic!*]" of the resolutions concerning Hungary; the mandate of Sir Leslie was once again renewed.

Sir Leslie Munro submitted to the General Assembly in September, 1962, his yearly report which registered no significant change and no compliance with the Assembly resolutions directed toward: (1) the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary, (2) free elections in Hungary under United Nations auspices, and (3) observance by the Hungarian authorities of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The United Nations resolutions on Hungary have, in the years subsequent to 1957, received a diminishing number of affirmative votes, while the number of abstentions has gradually increased. The 1961 resolution was adopted by 49 votes against 17 with 32 abstentions. Most of the abstentionists are Afro-Asian states, new members of the United Nations. In view of the growing number of abstentions and the danger that a two-thirds majority may not be attained, the United States delegation submitted before the 1962 Assembly session a draft resolution which significantly differed from those adopted in the last four years.

This resolution on Hungary, adopted by the General Assembly on December 18, 1962, reaffirming "the objectives" of earlier resolutions, requests the Secretary General "to take any initiative that he deems helpful in relation to the Hungarian question." The assignment of Sir Leslie Munro was thereby discontinued. The resolution was carried by 43 votes against 14 negative votes; 32 mem-

bers abstained from voting and 21 delegates were not present. It may, however, be recalled that for the first time India, so far the leading abstentionist power, voted for the resolution.

U Thant, the Secretary General, whose task it is now to handle the Hungarian question, has, since 1961, been invited to visit Budapest. He is likely to comply with this invitation in the course of 1963; if a settlement is thereby negotiated the likelihood is that the Secretary General, known to have lenient views on differences between Stalin's and Khrushchev's way of government, may accept mere symbolic or insignificant gestures by the Hungarian regime in return for full admission of the Hungarian delegation to the United Nations and the final deletion of the Hungarian problem from the agenda of the General Assembly.

It is to be wondered whether such an outcome of the Hungarian affair would not go beyond the intentions of the United States government which initiated the plan for entrusting this question to the Secretary General. The main promoter of Hungary's censure in the United Nations is the United States; this government has so far refused the resumption of normal diplomatic relations with the Kádár government, and maintains only a chargé d'affaires in Budapest. Future events will show whether United States policy will live up to election promises when a stand is again taken with regard to the thorny question of Hungary.

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*The question of Tito's successor "... is perhaps the most absorbing, publicly undiscussed problem in Yugoslav politics." "... Tito has qualities of leadership and personal magnetism not easily replaceable in a dictatorship that tries to base itself on popular support. ..."*

## Titoism in Flux

By FRED WARNER NEAL

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ONE MUST have a good deal of sympathy for the American reader who tries to keep abreast of developments in Yugoslavia. Having been advised after the war that Yugoslavia was a model Soviet-type police state, he learned in 1948 that Stalin excommunicated Tito because he was not a good Communist and that Tito denounced the U.S.S.R. as a dictatorship. While pondering reports that Yugoslavia had devised a decentralized and more democratic brand of communism which we were aiding economically and militarily, he found that Milovan Djilas, the chief advocate of decentralization and democracy, was put in jail and Tito and Khrushchev were friends again. He then saw reports that the Yugoslav economic system was further decentralized and had achieved great results, only to hear a year later of economic stagnation and the tightening of controls. As if this were not enough to confuse the American reader, his newspapers then told him first, that Tito had defended Soviet nuclear testing and attacked the West, and, second, that Communist China denounced Yugoslavia as a tool of the imperialists.

Despite the well-known peccadillos of American journalism, by and large all these conflicting reports were correct. Since the war, Yugoslavia has been in a constant state of flux, politically and economically, domestically and internationally. Yet, paradoxically,

there has been at the same time—since about 1950—a certain stability and even continuity which the headlines have not always reflected.

The major elements of Titoism seem relatively fixed. Externally there is Communist nationalism and independence from the Soviet Union. Internally there is a decentralized economic system in which autonomous, worker-managed enterprises, with few direct government controls, compete in a reasonably free market economy guided more by the law of supply and demand than by planning decrees. Agriculture has been de-collectivized, although a new type of cooperative increasingly spurs cooperation among the private peasants, who comprise most of the farm population. The Communist party has a monopoly of political power, but its voice has been muted as a result of greatly increased personal freedom, autonomy in local government and a nation-wide system of "direct democracy" in which more and more citizens participate in public decisions. (Locally elected and locally financed school districts, not unlike those in the United States, are an example of the latter.)

This Titoist system has by no means persuaded all Yugoslavs to become Communists. However, there is general recognition that the regime—in part because of its system and in part in spite of it—has achieved notable successes, even if economic viability cannot



yet be numbered among them. The standard of living has been boosted spectacularly from the depths of post-war poverty, and underdeveloped regions once more Near Eastern than European in appearance have been built up. The basis for industrialization of a backward agricultural society has been completed. The nationalities question has not been solved, but for the first time in Yugoslav history there is a national unity in which fratricidal conflict is not a danger.

Given these achievements, one may say that the zig-zagging of Yugoslav policies at home and abroad reflects experimentation and uncertainty more than crises. But the difference is not always easy to see, and the constancy of the pendulum effect poses the question of whether it is a temporary phenomenon or is inherent in the nature of Titoism.

### TITOISM

To understand the Yugoslav kaleidoscope and its significance, one must focus on the factors that set off Tito's regime from other Communist countries in Eastern Europe. First, Yugoslav communism came into being under its own steam rather than as a reflection of Soviet will and power. Although they were not dependent on Moscow like their comrades elsewhere, the Yugoslav Communists considered themselves faithful Muscovites, the most faithful of the faithful. When they demurred at Soviet efforts at economic and political domination and Stalin read them out of the international Communist movement, they underwent a deep psychological trauma. This forced and produced new interpretations of Marxism which led Tito and his aides to see themselves, the Soviet Union, communism and the world in a new light. And from this emerged their unique system which more than anything else pried open the Pandora's box of Communist nationalism.

In their new guise, the Yugoslav Communists espoused a neutralist foreign policy that was at first pro-Western, in considerable part because of Soviet hostility on the one hand, and large United States handouts on the other. Yet, as Tito kept reminding the West,

he and his followers were Communists and not Western-type democrats, despite the appearances of some aspects of political democracy in their system. Not only was the scorn of the rest of the Communist world hard to take, but Yugoslavs—Tito especially—had a strong yearning for Communist solidarity if it could be accomplished without giving up independence.

All this meant that Titoism had to try to maintain several positions which appear to be mutually contradictory, viz:

1. A decentralized, market economy and a planned Socialist system.
2. Political freedom and a Communist party monopoly on political power.
3. National independence, with a neutralist foreign policy, and efforts at solidarity with the Moscow-led Communist bloc.

The Yugoslav national disinclination to practice restraint and moderation has aggravated the problem of finding a balance. Initial decentralization in the early 1950's came too fast and went too far. Despite the skeptics' doubts, factories really were turned over to the workers, and the workers did just what might be expected: they first raised wages and then found they had to raise prices. Reliance on market competition eliminated some more inefficient producers, but in addition to the resulting inflation there was also waste and uneconomic investment that the backward Yugoslav society could ill afford.

By 1956, a drastic tightening of controls was necessary. Economic order was restored, but whereas earlier worker management was too uncontrolled, now it was too restricted. Necessary wage increases were held up, and in 1958 there were—to the shock of the leadership—a series of strikes by workers who in theory controlled their own enterprises. As a result, a new trend toward relaxation was decreed, and for a while it appeared that a proper balance was at hand. Production soared, and with two exceptionally good harvests, Yugoslavia began to experience an unprecedented boom.

Now, once again, with prosperity on the horizon, there was pressure for more liberaliz-

ation. In 1961, virtually all wage restrictions were removed; and controls on prices, production and even foreign trade were greatly relaxed. To ease the impact of freer imports, \$275 million in Western credits was negotiated. One of the aims of the new program was to boost the supply of consumer goods. This succeeded all too well. There was a veritable orgy of production, importation and buying of consumer goods—from electric stoves to automobiles. Prices soared, necessitated by sweeping wage increases and made possible by extensive, decentralized credit.

Production of basic industrial goods lagged, and so did exports—both vitally necessary to the precarious Yugoslav economy. With a foreign debt of nearly \$800 million, the country ended the year with a hard currency adverse trade balance of \$167 million. By the spring of 1962, the boom had turned into a capitalist-like crisis. Many enterprises were in serious trouble, and workers' councils began laying off employees. Tito, speaking from Diocletian's ancient city of Split, called a halt and ordered a return to tighter controls and more government direction.

The ups and downs of the economic system have a general although not absolute parallel in the political climate. The early decentralization was accompanied by the elimination of most of the harsher aspects of the police state and a wave of enthusiasm for a more democratic society. But here too—at least from the standpoint of the regime—things went too fast. By the end of 1953, Djilas was calling for the elimination of the Communist party altogether, with widespread popular approval both in and out of the Party. Tito stepped in—somewhat reluctantly but firmly—to silence Djilas, or, more accurately, to try to silence him. For Djilas, with the courage and recklessness so typical of his native Montenegro, went on to demand two-party elections and finally—in *The New Class*—to oppose communism as a system in both its Yugoslav and Soviet guises.

Initially, Djilas was doing little more than spelling out what other members of the hierarchy—including Tito himself—had proclaimed as doctrine. It would be unfair and

inaccurate to say that they were not sincere in talking, for instance, about a “withering away” of the Party. But for them this was a theoretical position to be achieved only over the very long run and within a Communist framework—indeed as a means of implementing their peculiar brand of communism. For Djilas the system was not so important as democracy and he wanted to achieve it at once.

### TIGHTENING OF CONTROL

Although Djilas himself posed no threat to the regime's power, the impact of his ideas—widely publicized throughout Yugoslavia before his fall—was considerable and resulted in a serious disorientation, especially among younger members of the League of Communists, as the Yugoslav Communist party had been renamed in 1952. A tightening of Party discipline was decreed, and there was a reassertion of Party influence throughout the country. Criticism was discouraged. There was no return to the earlier police state, but there were political trials of minor figures. Ill-disguised intimidation of dissidents occurred, particularly in the more backward areas where many Party bureaucrats had never really approved of the new system.

The new political freedom had been an indispensable factor in making economic decentralization and local autonomy meaningful; now Party interference began to cut down on freedom of workers' councils and people's committees. This, too, led to abuses and produced widespread if muted grumbling. Public opinion in Yugoslavia does not determine policy, but can influence it; and especially when accompanied by such manifestations as strikes, public opinion could not be ignored. Worried by the extent of Party interference, the League of Communists' top body, the Executive Committee, denounced abuses of Party authority and privilege in 1958 in phrases resembling Milovan Djilas on the new class, albeit without Djilas' anti-Communist overtones. The ensuing freer political climate was marked by increased public discussion, a liberalized criminal code, an end to harassment of regime critics (like Vladimir Dedijer)

and finally in 1961, the release of Djilas from prison.

The question in 1962 was whether the new economic controls would again be followed by a political crack-down with totalitarian overtones. The reimprisonment of Djilas, after publication abroad of his innocuous book, *Conversations with Stalin*, may have been occasioned more by personal pique on the part of Tito and the hierarchy than by politics, but it did not augur well. Neither did Tito's call for a resurgence of Party discipline, his warnings against criticism of the regime and his attacks on "decadent phenomena" in art and literature. At the same time, by the end of the year there was no evidence of the kind of Party and police intimidation which reappeared in 1956. On the contrary, a good deal of public discussion of the new proposed constitution was frank and spirited, and the constitution itself contained provisions that seemed intended not only to safeguard against any return to totalitarianism but also to further the trend away from it.

One question mark in all this, however, is the future of Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union. In the past, regardless of cause and effect relationship, the trend toward tighter control in the economy and in politics coincided with moves toward rapprochement with the U.S.S.R.; and the reverse trend toward liberalization began when these efforts broke down. The current Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement has gone further than ever before, and it remains to be seen what, if any, effect it will have on internal affairs.

In 1957, believing that he could influence the course of events in the Soviet Union and in the Communist world generally, Tito seemed ready to become a "non-member" of the Soviet bloc of States. At that time Moscow's price for amity was too high. Soviet demands for changes in Yugoslav theory and practice and for acceptance of Moscow's leadership in foreign policy would have meant a virtual end to Yugoslav independence. At the last minute Tito, despite his strong desire for Communist solidarity, refused to go along,

and the effort at rapprochement ended with bitter recriminations on both sides.

Today, however, the situation has changed. Tito is still unwilling to give up independence, but he feels certain that he is not being asked to. Moreover, he believes that he has succeeded in influencing Soviet policies. As seen from Belgrade, the comparative freedom achieved by the Soviet satellites reflects a genuine acceptance of the Yugoslav insistence on "independent paths to socialism." Khrushchev's revised stand on war and capitalism—the new peaceful coexistence—seems to echo earlier Titoist positions. While important differences—both ideological and practical—in the positions of the two Communist systems remain, Tito is convinced that Khrushchev really seeks a *detente* with the West. Therefore Tito feels his new close relationship with the U.S.S.R. should cause no uneasiness in the West. From Tito's point of view, it is necessary to support Khrushchev not only because Khrushchev stands for peace but also to strengthen him against the "Stalinists" at home and abroad.

The role of the Chinese Communists is itself an important factor in bringing Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union together. Violent opponents of Titoism, the Chinese have also used Yugoslavia as a stalking horse in their quarrel with the U.S.S.R. in no small degree because they see Khrushchev becoming a Titoist, at least on broad questions of foreign policy. In addition, the Chinese have pried Albania loose from Soviet influence, and the Albanians have always been bitter and unreconstructed anti-Titoists. It is not unnatural that the greater the gulf between Moscow and Peking-Tirana, the narrower the gulf between Moscow and Belgrade.

### NEUTRALIST POLICY

While the Belgrade view of all this may not be without merit, Yugoslavia's economic problems and Western policies—particularly American—also play a part. The fact is that Yugoslavia's independent neutralist position, so often jibing with Moscow's, was never well received in Washington. At his 1961 conference of neutralist nations in Belgrade,

Tito reiterated earlier criticisms of the West at the same time refraining from criticizing the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. Ambassador George Kennan, who had been led to believe that Tito's performance would be more pleasing to the United States, took almost personal affront, and his reports to the State Department were partly responsible for the violent reaction of the Kennedy administration. This in turn contributed to congressional action restricting aid to Yugoslavia to agricultural shipments and denying Yugoslavia the most favored nation treatment extended to non-Soviet bloc countries. Both Ambassador Kennan and the Administration objected to this action, feeling it tended to push Yugoslavia further toward the Kremlin, without apparently recognizing their own responsibility for it.

Although congressional action wounded Yugoslav pride, the Yugoslavs were somewhat philosophical about it, especially since the Administration was trying to have the discrimination removed. (Foreign Secretary Popović told this writer last year that he realized the legislative restriction did not reflect Administration views. And he added: "Every country has its peculiar people. What distinguishes the United States is that you put them in your parliament.") The impact on the Yugoslav economy was more severe, at least potentially. Nearly 60 per cent of Yugoslav trade is now with the West, and the United States occupies first place in Yugoslav imports and third place in exports. Without aid, the decrease in exports, certain to result if tariff discrimination stands, would necessitate sharp reduction in important purchases from the United States. (For the first 11 months of 1962, Yugoslav imports from the United States amounted to \$176 million.)

This development occurred at the same time Belgrade was worrying about trade exclusion from Western Europe as a result of Common Market policies. Although the Yugoslavs did not wish to join either the Common Market or the Soviet trading bloc, they feared exclusion from both. The Common Market countries showed less inclination than the Eastern bloc to permit a special

trading relationship. As a result the Yugoslavs were particularly conscious of possible advantages of closer relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Tito realized that neither in trade nor aid can the East provide what Yugoslavia needs. If nothing else, this will undoubtedly move Belgrade to try to maintain friendly relations with the West. Whether they can or not is something else.

Yugoslavia almost certainly will not relinquish its independence, but Tito's yen for Communist solidarity plus Western refusal to accept this without reprisals, could, given economic difficulties, push Yugoslavia further into the Soviet bloc than anybody at present wants to go. Up until now, Belgrade's bargaining position with Moscow has been good. Without hope of aid or trade from the West, increasing economic troubles in Yugoslavia could put the U.S.S.R. in a much better position to make demands. Many in Yugoslavia as well as elsewhere fear that in such case the demands might be high.

This worries some Yugoslav Communists. If some of them support Tito's desire to become a "non-member" of the bloc, others would like to emphasize the "non" instead of the "bloc." Here Tito's role as the prime mover for closer relations with the Soviet Union brings up the problem of Titoism after Tito.

(Continued on page 309)

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*"The rift between Albania and the Soviet Union can be traced to the first days of Khrushchev's ascendancy in the Kremlin. Albanian confidence in Soviet leadership was gravely shaken by Khrushchev's devastating denunciation of Joseph Stalin. . . . Albanian leaders could not stomach the attacks on Stalin and his policies and rejected Khrushchev's notion of 'peaceful coexistence.'"*

## The Albanian-Soviet Rift

By WAYNE S. VUCINICH

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THE SOVIET-Albanian rift, usually presented in ideological terms, is a consequence of the dissimilar national objectives of the two countries, their unparallel social and economic development, and their distinctive cultures. Tiny Albania is the most backward state in Europe, largely due to a long period of rule by the Ottoman Turks as well as lasting tribal and confessional divisions. To this day, many Albanians live on a subsistence basis. Small in area and population, their country lacks adequate communications and transportation. Its young educational system produces far too few trained personnel. But this Balkan nation has two important assets: a fair amount of mineral resources and a dynamic people.

Throughout its brief existence as a state, Albania has been compelled to rely on a foreign power for protection and assistance. Following the First World War, this power was Italy; between 1945 and 1948, it was Yugoslavia; from 1948 to 1959, the Soviet Union; and since 1959, China.

When Mussolini's Black Shirts conquered Albania in the spring of 1939, the little kingdom was torn by confessional, social, ethnic and political conflicts.<sup>1</sup> The Tosks of the South were competing for power with the

Ghegs of the North, who had supplied an unpopular dynasty. The dominant Muslims and insecure Christians worked at cross-purposes. The sharpening antagonism between the peasantry and landlords and the clamoring middle class deepened the already acute economic crisis. To all this was added the country's delicate international position. Yet the Italian occupation and the introduction of a fascist government met with widespread resistance.

In Albania, as in other Balkan countries, no middle class group was capable of organizing a nation-wide resistance movement, primarily because the middle class was split in its allegiance to different sectional, ethnic, or religious interests. The Communists could do what the middle classes could not. On November 8, 1941, with the aid of Yugoslav Communists, the three separate Albanian Communist groups united into a single party. Chosen as leader of the Central Committee was Enver Hoxha, a 35-year-old teacher. Although internal discord continued, the Party was able to extend its organization, to found party auxiliaries, and to attract followers.

In practically every detail, the Albanian Communists modelled their organization and activities after those of the Yugoslav Communists. The Albanian and Yugoslav resistance movements were able to liberate their own countries without direct Allied aid. They

<sup>1</sup> See "Communism Gains in Albania," *Current History*, October, 1951, pp. 212-219 and December, 1951, pp. 345-352.

were able to "effect" Communist revolutions without the aid of the Soviet Red Army. On November 17 1945, Hoxha's troops freed Tirana, the capital city, and, on December 4, 1945, the complete liberation of the country was formally announced.

The Albanian Communist government sought to secure international recognition and to establish a Communist-style "people's democracy." To reach socialist and national goals, Albania still needed the protection of a foreign power, economic aid, diplomatic support, and political and ideological counsel. Yugoslavia filled the bill.

Tito supported Albanian application for membership in the United Nations, its right to receive U.N.R.R.A. aid, its claims for reparations, and its request for participation in the Paris Peace Conference. In 1945, the Yugoslavs signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, and a Naval Agreement with Tirana. On November 27, 1946, the two countries established a customs union, a currency union, and a broad program of economic cooperation. Several joint companies were also formed. Hoxha publicly acknowledged Yugoslavia's magnanimity.

All went well until the summer of 1948. It even looked as though Albania might enter the Yugoslav federation. But Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform in June, 1948, changed the course of Yugoslav-Albanian relations. Faced with a difficult alternative, Hoxha sided with Stalin rather than with Tito.

After 1948, Albania annulled all agreements with Yugoslavia and expelled Yugoslav diplomats, technicians, and other personnel. By 1951, diplomatic intercourse had ended completely and trade relations had dried up. Albanian officials, press and radio daily attacked Tito and his government. While the Yugoslavs argued that their help to Albania had been given unconditionally and without malicious intent, the Albanians complained of Yugoslavia's attempt to control their destiny.

Albanian leaders broke with Yugoslavia out of sincere conviction, out of loyalty to Stalin, or out of sheer opportunism. Perhaps

all these factors figured in their decision. Furthermore, a latent but basic Albanian-Yugoslav animosity stemmed from the clash of national objectives. Evidence also exists that the Yugoslav hierarchy distrusted Enver Hoxha and favored the second-ranking Koci Xoxe.

## ALBANIAN NATIONALISM

Albanian nationalism was the last to develop in modern Europe, and the Albanians never truly achieved national unification. Although recognized in 1912, Albanian independence could not be fully realized until after the First World War. Following the war, Albanian independence survived the threats of Yugoslav and Greek neighbors only to fall victim to Italian colonialism.

As constituted, Albania does not embrace all the territory inhabited by its nationals. While the people of "unredeemed" districts do not always agree with the political views of the Albanians in Albania proper, they share the common aspiration for national unification. Ironically, the wartime collaborationist regime, established and held in power by Mussolini's troops, united the Albanians into a single "state." This was a weak creation, built on faulty foundations, but it helped to promote the idea of "Great Albania."

The territory which the Albanians claim from Yugoslavia is the Kosovo-Metohija (Kosmet) region—the *terra sacra* of the Serbian nation. Here was the cradle of the Serbian medieval state and civilization, and here, on the Field of the Black Birds (*Kosovo polje*), the Serbs lost their independence to the Turks in 1389. National greatness and national tragedy are associated with Kosovo, and are the very essence of Serbian history. When the Serbs withdrew from Kosmet, it was occupied by Muslim Albanians and Turks. Yet no responsible Yugoslav leader, regardless of his political ideology and ethnic background, would now surrender Kosmet to Albania. From 1945 until 1948, the Kosmet was left in virtual limbo. Given a small degree of autonomy, the region seemed to depend for its destiny on the progress of Albanian-Yugoslav relations. Yugoslav and at

least some Albanian Communists worked toward integration of the economic and political life of their two countries with the hope of preparing the ground for Albania's eventually becoming a member of the Yugoslav federation. In that case the problem of Kosmet would have been resolved.

Many Albanians, however, were suspicious of Yugoslav designs, and, when the Tito-Stalin rupture occurred, they looked on it as a chance to assert independence and to annex the Kosmet. The Soviet Union exerted political, economic and military pressure on Yugoslavia in favor of dividing the southern parts of Yugoslavia between Bulgaria and Albania. Such action would have established direct Soviet access to Albania along with the further isolation of Yugoslavia.

With the prospects of Albania's joining the Yugoslav federation having vanished, the Yugoslav government adopted a policy of developing Kosmet into the center of Albanian national life, raising Kosmet above the level of Albania's development, so that eventually it might absorb Albania rather than be absorbed by it.

The Yugoslav government has unquestionably contributed much to the social and economic development of Kosmet. Communication and transportation facilities have been improved and greatly enlarged. Many schools have been built. A center of higher learning (a university with philosophical and law faculties) has been founded in Priština, Kosmet's capital. Books, newspapers and periodicals are published in the Albanian language. Priština boasts of a radio station, which broadcasts in Serbian as well as in Albanian, and of a modern theater. Formerly a backward town, Priština today is a progressive city of about 34,000 with many up-to-date buildings. Mechanization of agriculture, expanded mining, and industrialization have given Kosmet a substantial social and economic boost.

Better living conditions in Yugoslavia have attracted many refugees from Albania, who fled either for economic reasons or to escape from Hoxha's Stalinist dictatorship. For the Yugoslavs, the additional Albanians, though

of momentary propagandistic value, can only aggravate the Albanian question in the long run. The Yugoslavs have found it impossible to assimilate the indigenous Albanians, who have shown a tremendous reproductive capacity. All in all, Kosmet raises a complex question that will trouble Yugoslavia and Albania until it is resolved to their mutual satisfaction.

## **ALBANIA AND THE SOVIET UNION**

After its recognition of Albania on November 10, 1945, the Soviet Union extended various kinds of material and diplomatic assistance to Albania. The Soviet representatives defended the interests of Albania at international conferences. In July, 1947, Hoxha visited Moscow and obtained economic credit for Albania's economic development.

Albania figured prominently in Soviet military plans; its harbors offered haven to Soviet submarines. The natural resources of Albania, especially oil and nonferrous minerals, seemed to offer strategic advantages to the Soviet Union. The geographic position of Albania, first in connection with the Greek civil war and then in relation to Yugoslavia, was likewise important in the military and political schemes of the Kremlin.

After the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform, the Soviet Union filled in the vacuum in Albania created by the withdrawal of Yugoslavia. Henceforth Albania undertook to build socialism with the assistance of the Soviet Union and its satellites, especially Czechoslovakia. But despite comradely cordiality and Hoxha's visits to Moscow, Albania was never able to obtain all the economic aid it needed. Nonetheless, Soviet influence in Albania became pervasive.

With Stalinization came purges and liquidation of Titoist elements. The first prominent Communist to go was Koci Xoxe, possibly the most able Albanian leader. He was tried and executed in 1949. The Albanian government complained incessantly of spies and foreign agents who were seeking to infiltrate the country. Frequent skirmishes occurred between opposing patrols on the Yugoslav border. Backed by Soviet arms,

Hoxha spoke loudly and shook his finger at his neighbors and the American "imperialists."

By 1960, the Soviet Union had extended nearly \$200 million worth of aid to Albania. In 1957, because Albania was unable to meet its financial obligations, the Soviet Union had to write off credits to the amount of \$87 million, to cancel debts in the amount of \$18.5 million, and to extend loans in the following years in excess of \$100 million to facilitate the projects outlined in Albania's Third Five-Year Plan (1961-1965). Yet behind this apparent cordiality, the leaders of the two parties did not see eye to eye on many points.

### DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS

The rift between Albania and the Soviet Union can be traced to the first days of Khrushchev's ascendancy in the Kremlin. Albanian confidence in Soviet leadership was gravely shaken by Khrushchev's devastating denunciation of Joseph Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (February 13-25, 1956). Nor was this all. To Albania's great chagrin, Marshal Tito was given a warm welcome during his June 2-20, 1956, visit to the Soviet Union. Albanian leaders could not stomach the attacks on Stalin and his policies and rejected Khrushchev's notion of "peaceful coexistence." At first cautious in their criticism of the Khrushchev line, the Albanians gradually spelled out their grievances and began to criticize Khrushchev openly.

Albania is but a step removed from a partriarchal society with strong kinship ties. Even if the Communist system has formally superseded the traditional way of life, habits of mind have shown great resistance to change. Despite superficial modernity, human relations in Albania are still largely governed by traditional mores. While Soviet leaders may accept and understand shifts in ideology and tactics, the Albanians find it difficult "to eat words"—to condemn Stalin and to praise Khrushchev. To denounce Tito in the vilest language for years and then to forget this and agree to coexist with him is

not easy for them. But Hoxha's Albania could not long argue with the Soviet Union without a powerful protector.

### CHINA AND ALBANIA

A special combination of circumstances yielded just such a protector in Mao Tse-tung of China. Since the death of Stalin, Sino-Soviet relations had rapidly deteriorated. In many respects, the Sino-Soviet and the Soviet-Albanian conflicts are similar: divergent interpretation of Communist tactics and goals, disparity in economic development, differing cultures, the personality question, the question of unredeemed territories, the urge for expansion (i.e., China's claim on Outer Mongolia, Siberia and Central Asia), the messianism, and the Sino-Soviet "big power" rivalry for world leadership and spheres of influence. The Chinese reject much of the Soviet interpretation of Marxism on the ground that it is self-serving.

As Sino-Soviet relations became more tenuous in late 1959, Albania became more bold in its criticism of Khrushchev. Clearly, the Albanian and Chinese leaders must have engaged in frequent consultation. The first real sign of the rift between Albania and the Soviet camp was the absence of both Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, Albania's premier, from the meeting of the Rumanian Communist party, in Bucharest, on June 22, 1960. An Albanian representative, Hysni Kapo, lauded China and, on most issues, sided with the Chinese delegate. Soon afterward the Soviet Union decided to reduce its economic aid and to connive with a pro-Soviet faction of Albanians in planning the overthrow of the Hoxha-Shehu regime. The plot was discovered in September, 1960, and drastic counter measures were taken.

In September, 1960, unlike other heads of state, Hoxha did not participate in the special session of the United Nations General Assembly but sent Premier Shehu instead. Shehu, who said nothing in New York to irritate the Soviets, was rebuffed by them and other Communist representatives from eastern Europe. By November, 1960, relations between Albania and the Soviet Union were

on the verge of a complete break. At the Conference of the Eighty-One Communist Parties held in Moscow during that month, Hoxha criticized Khrushchev's policy. At the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Workers party in February, 1961, Soviet representatives were treated with hostility, while those from China were given the warmest of receptions. In his speech, Hoxha swore loyalty to the Soviet Union—but on *his* conditions. The speech by the Soviet ambassador was "admonitory," and that by the Polish delegate was a plea for the healing of the schism. Needless to say, the attitude of the Albanians enraged Khrushchev.

On February 20, 1961, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist party protested that Albania's criticisms would lead to dire consequences. Later, Khrushchev and Czechoslovak President Antonín Novotný threatened to cut off economic aid unless the Albanians changed their stand. Neither Hoxha nor Shehu were invited to the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact nations on March 28–29, 1961.

On April 25, 1961, the Soviet Union withdrew its specialists from Albania and, soon afterwards, cancelled all economic aid. Shortly afterward, on May 26, the Soviet Union reportedly withdrew its submarines from the Vlorë (Valona) base. Czechoslovakia and East Germany blocked credits they had promised to Albania since 1959 and started to withdraw their technicians and experts.

But as aid from the European Communist states dwindled, that from China increased. China agreed to supply Albania with substantial credits and to send specialists for the construction of various industrial projects. It replaced the Soviet Union as the leading partner in Albania's foreign trade. The execution of the Third Five-Year Plan (1961–1965) depends largely upon Chinese aid.

That relations between Albania and the Soviet Union were irretrievably severed can be seen from Hoxha's absence from the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Pact nations, held in Moscow on August 3–5, 1961, to

discuss the German problem and from the Pankow celebration of the Twelfth Anniversary of the German Democratic Republic in September, 1961. Conversely, no representative from European Communist countries attended the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Women's Union in October of the same year.

## THE SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS

At the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow in October, 1961, Khrushchev again attacked Hoxha; he called him an "unreconstructed Stalinist" and accused him of perpetuating "the cult of personality" and of working against the policies endorsed by the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet party. Other Soviet spokesmen emulated Khrushchev in his denunciation of Hoxha.

What the Soviets were saying seemed to be directed more at Peking than at Albania, and not everyone supported them. Several Asian delegates, particularly those from North Korea and North Vietnam, refused to attack Albania. Chou En-lai himself praised the Soviet Union and Sino-Soviet friendship but noted that the declaration issued by the Communist parties specified a patient and private resolution of differences between Communist parties. That Khrushchev's words were also directed at China was suggested by Chou En-lai's sudden departure from Moscow on October 23.

The Soviets reacted immediately to Chou En-lai's barbed criticism. Kozlov insisted that bringing controversies into the open is the Marxist-Leninist way, because secrecy encourages anti-Leninist "fallacies." He insisted that, on various occasions, the Soviets tried to reach agreement with the Albanians. Mikoyan criticized Hoxha for his Stalinism and accused Shehu of using Stalinist terror in fighting those who disagreed with him and with Hoxha. He charged that the Albanians had traded internationalism for nationalism.

In his speech on October 27, Khrushchev concentrated on Stalinist inhumanities and elaborated on the problem of China and



Albania. He compared the brutality of the Albanian police to that of Imperial Russian police and charged that Liri Gega, a prominent Albanian Communist of Soviet orientation, had been executed while pregnant. Like Kozlov, he insisted that it would be best to bring the dispute into the open. All efforts by the Soviets, he said, to mend the schism had been frustrated by the Albanians. He pleaded with the Chinese to help in reconciling Albania and the Soviet Union.

The Albanian leaders themselves were stunned by Khrushchev's words and the Albanian Central Committee, on October 29, 1961, challenged Khrushchev's right to speak on behalf of the Soviet party. On November 2, 1961, the official organ *Zëri i Popullit* published a long eulogy to Stalin and at the same time denounced Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization and leniency toward Tito. On November 7, 1961, Hoxha spoke against the concept of "peaceful co-existence" with the non-Communist world and against the Soviet stand on the Berlin issue; he condemned Khrushchev as a "revisionist," "anti-Marxist," and a defeatist. He seemed especially bitter about the admission of "the Tito clique of imperialist lackeys" into the family of respectable socialist states.

Hoxha portrayed Stalin as a true follower of Lenin and one of the greatest political leaders and theorists, who never compromised and always struggled for the purity of Marxism-Leninism. The Albanians conceded that Stalin might have erred, but they asserted that Khrushchev had exaggerated his faults. The Albanian Embassy in Moscow distributed copies of Hoxha's speech and various other anti-Soviet statements. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union and other Communist states withdrew their ambassadors from Tirana and henceforth isolated Albania from official party meetings and celebrations. Albania was expelled from the Warsaw Pact and from the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). This decision was condemned by the Albanians.

Whether Hoxha really loved Stalin may be problematical, but it is certain that he imitated him with success. The "Little

Stalin," as he is sometimes called, was able to keep himself in power largely through the same kind of terror employed by Stalin. Moreover, Stalin's uncompromising stand against Yugoslavia was popular in Albania. For these reasons Hoxha was able to retain his dominant position and to avert a major internal crisis.

As its relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, Albania made overtures to the Western countries for the restoration of diplomatic relations. The immediate consequences of this new policy were improved trade arrangements with Western Germany, France, Italy, Austria and some of the Asian and African countries. The improvement of relations with Great Britain has been slow, while no real attempt has been made to normalize relations with the United States. For Albania, the United States epitomizes imperialism and figures as the principal enemy of Communist China—Albania's sole genuine ally. The Italian airline (Alitalia) was given the right to operate from Bari to Tirana which makes it possible for Albania, surrounded by Greece and Yugoslavia, and without ocean-going ships, to maintain contacts with the outside world.

Thus far, Albania has turned down Yugoslavia's proposals for the restoration of friendly relations. In January, 1962, Yugoslavia granted added autonomy to the Albanians of Kosmet, though those who oppose the Yugoslav regime are still vigorously persecuted. Greek and Albanian spokesmen hinted that they would like to improve relations between their two countries. In January, 1962, Prime Minister Karamanlis spoke of his government's readiness to negotiate.  
(Continued on page 310)

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Wayne S. Vucinich served in World War II as an East European specialist with the O.S.S.; with the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria in 1944-1945; and with the Department of State, 1945-1946. He is the author of *Serbia between East and West*. In 1956, Mr. Vucinich visited Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union.

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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# United States-Polish Agricultural Commodities Agreement

*On February 1, 1963, the United States and Poland signed an agreement providing for the sale to Poland of specified United States agricultural commodities, valued at \$51.6 million. Since 1957 similar agreements under Public Law 480 have provided for a total of \$477.2 million in such sales to Poland, including this agreement, the partial text of which follows:*

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Polish People's Republic;

Recognizing the desirability of expanding trade in agricultural commodities between their two countries in a manner which would not displace usual marketings of the United States of America in these commodities or unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities;

Considering that the purchase for zlotys of agricultural commodities produced in the United States of America will assist in achieving such an expansion of trade;

Desiring to set forth the understandings which will govern the sales, as specified below, of agricultural commodities to Poland pursuant to Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and the measures which the two Governments will take individually and collectively in furthering the expansion of trade in such commodities;

Have agreed as follows:

### ARTICLE I: SALES FOR ZLOTYS

1. Subject to issuance by the Government of the United States of America and acceptance by the Government of the Polish People's Republic of purchase authorizations and to the availability of commodities under the Act at the time of exportation, the Government of the United States of America undertakes

to finance the sales for zlotys to purchasers authorized by the Government of the Polish People's Republic of the following agricultural commodities in the amounts indicated:

Commodity	Export Market Value (Millions)
Wheat	\$38.1
Cotton	7.1
Tobacco (leaf)	2.6
Ocean Transportation (est.)	3.8
Total	\$51.6

2. Applications for purchase authorizations will be made within 90 calendar days of the effective date of this Agreement, except that applications for purchase authorizations for any additional commodities or amounts of commodities provided for in any amendment to this Agreement will be made within 90 days of the effective date of such amendment. Purchase authorizations will be issued promptly and will include provisions relating to the sale and delivery of commodities, the time and circumstances of deposit of the zlotys accruing from such sale, and other relevant matters.

3. The financing, sale and delivery of commodities under this Agreement may be terminated by either Government if that Government determines that because of changed conditions the continuation of such financing, sale or delivery is unnecessary or undesirable.

**ARTICLE II: USES OF ZLOTYS**

1. The two Governments agree that the zlotys accruing to the Government of the United States of America as a consequence of the sale made pursuant to this Agreement will be used by the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with Section 104 of the Act, to help develop new markets for United States agricultural commodities under subsection (a) thereof; to finance the purchase of goods or services for other countries under subsection (d) thereof; to pay United States obligations under subsection (f) thereof; to finance educational exchange activities under subsection (h) thereof; to finance the translation, publication and distribution of books and periodicals under subsection (i) thereof; and for other expenditures by the Government of the United States of America under subsections (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (q), and (r) thereof.

2. The zlotys accruing under this Agreement shall be expended by the Government of the United States of America, for the purpose stated in paragraph 1 of this Article, in such manner and order of priority as the Government of the United States of America shall determine. It is understood that, with respect to the purchase of goods or services for other countries, the types, quantities and prices will be subject to negotiation between the two Governments.

**ARTICLE III: DEPOSIT OF ZLOTYS**

1. The amount of zlotys to be deposited to the account of the Government of the United States of America shall be the equivalent of the dollar sales value of the commodities and ocean transportation costs reimbursed or financed by the Government of the United States of America . . . converted into zlotys.

\* \* \*

[Section 2 and Section 3 (a), (b), (c) omitted]

3. (d) If any unused balance remains in such special dollar denominated account on and after January 2, 1973, the Government of the Polish People's Republic agrees that, if the

United States Government shall so elect, the National Bank of Poland will sell to the Government of the United States the sum of \$1,720,000 in dollar exchange annually, beginning January 2, 1973, and on each succeeding January 2, such dollar exchange to be paid for by reducing the balance in the dollar denominated account by the same amount.

**ARTICLE IV: GENERAL UNDERTAKINGS**

1. The Government of the Polish People's Republic will take all possible measures to prevent the resale or transshipment to other countries or the use for other than domestic purposes (except where such resale, transshipment or use is specifically approved by the Government of the United States of America) of the agricultural commodities purchased pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement and to assure that the purchase of such commodities does not result in increased availability of these or like commodities for export to other countries.

2. The two Governments will take reasonable precautions to assure that all sales or purchases of agricultural commodities made pursuant to this Agreement will not displace usual marketings of the United States of America in these commodities or unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities.

3. The Government of the Polish People's Republic will furnish upon request of the Government of the United States of America, information on the progress of the program, particularly with respect to the arrival and condition of commodities and the understandings regarding commercial imports, and information relating to exports of the same or like commodities.

**ARTICLE V: CONSULTATION**

The two Governments will, upon the request of either of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the application of this Agreement or to the operation of arrangements carried out pursuant to this Agreement.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### ON EAST EUROPE . . .

**REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY.** By Paul E. Zinner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. 380 pages. Bibliographical note and index. \$6.00).

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 was one of the most dramatic and tragic experiences of this generation. It witnessed the toppling of a Communist regime and "exploded a prevailing myth which held that highly developed political consciousness, together with absolute monopolistic control of the means of coercion, persuasion, and production, effectively immunized Communist totalitarian governments against rebellion."

To the Columbia University Research Project on Hungary, in general, and to Professor Zinner and his associates, in particular, we are indebted for this outstanding study of "the evolution of Hungarian society in all its complexity from the collapse of the old order in the Second World War to the breakdown, eleven years later, of the totalitarian system that had taken its place." Based on a representative sample of interviews with Hungarian refugees, as well as on documentary data, this study traces the interdependence "and the changing character of relations between social forces and among individuals. . . ."

A.Z.R.

**HUNGARY TODAY.** By the Editors of *Survey* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. 104 pages. \$3.85).

*Hungary Today* is a collection of articles devoted to a review of developments during the five years since the 1956 revolution was defeated. The Kadar regime has granted a degree of relaxation greater than that enjoyed by any of the Soviet satellites, except Poland.

The contributors to this useful, informa-

tive symposium discuss developments in literature, the Party, the leadership, the Catholic Church, the economy, the conditions of everyday life, and Hungary's new status within the Soviet bloc.

The intelligentsia is being stifled but not strangled; the economy is being rationalized and streamlined, "so that the worst deformation of Rakosi's planners have been corrected." All factors point to the growing consolidation of the Kadar regime.

Certainly, any student of Eastern European affairs will find this a valuable source of reference.

A.Z.R.

**POLAND 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People.** By Richard F. Staar (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1962. 300 pages. Bibliography and index, \$7.50).

In this well-documented, effectively organized work Richard Staar focuses on contemporary Poland and on the attempts of the Polish Communist party to create and control a Communist Poland.

Relying heavily on Polish materials, the author presents useful information. He is pessimistic over Poland's chances of avoiding transformation into a complete Soviet satellite. In concluding that the "political structure of the country is actually based upon the U.S.S.R. prototype," and that the economy and foreign policy are developed in accordance with Soviet dictates, the author sees no immediate likelihood of any change in Poland's continued drift to complete sovietization. He notes that the Roman Catholic Church is the only organization which "could successfully compete with the regime for the allegiance of the population." In this assessment, he may be underestimating the vitality and tenacity of traditional Polish nationalism,

an intangible force that may continue to keep Poland the most individualistic and nationalistic of the Soviet satellites.

A.Z.R.

**POLISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1932-1939.** By Bohdan B. Budurowycz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. 229 pages. Bibliography and index, \$6.00).

With care and thoughtful analysis, Dr. Budurowycz has traced "the course of Polish-Soviet relations from the conclusion of the nonaggression pact between the two nations in July, 1932, until the fourth partition of Poland in September, 1939." The complex strands of international developments and changing alignments are interwoven to produce a valuable study. Underlying Poland's quest for an independent existence was a tragic fact of geography: between Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany, Poland's chances for extended survival were poor. In particular, as the author notes, the "almost, instinctive and deep-seated mistrust of the U.S.S.R. was the dominant feature of Polish foreign policy between the wars: it led to the underestimation of the German danger, was instrumental in determining Poland's attitude toward Czechoslovakia, and alienated her temporarily from her French ally."

A.Z.R.

**DEATH IN THE FOREST:** The story of the Katyn Forest Massacre. By J. K. Zawodny (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1962. 235 pages. Appendix, bibliography, and index. \$6.50).

After the Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland in September, 1939, 250,000 Polish soldiers, including 10,000 officers, were taken prisoner by the Soviet Union. When the Germans invaded the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941, the great bulk of these soldiers were repatriated to the West, where they fought gallantly in Italy and France. Of the total, some 15,000 remained unaccounted for by Soviet authorities. In April, 1943,

the Nazi Government announced that it had uncovered the mass graves of some 10,000 Polish prisoners near Smolensk, then part of Nazi-occupied Russia.

Professor Zawodny sets himself the ambitious and unenviable task of seeking "to reconstruct, in detail, the fate of the prisoners and to provide the answers to these questions: 1) Who killed these men? 2) How were they killed? 3) Why were they killed?"

With meticulous care and scholarship, he has probed into the mass of often contradictory information, combing records and interviewing survivors. The result is a masterful, dispassionate study which convincingly places the blame on the Soviet Union.

A.Z.R.

**YUGOSLAVIA IN CRISIS, 1934-1941.** By J. B. Hoptner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. 328 pages. Appendix, bibliography, and index. \$6.50).

Dr. Hoptner has written an authoritative, absorbing account of Yugoslavia in the years prior to the second World War. His main object is "to examine the attempt of a small state to accommodate itself to the superior force of two neighboring powers at a time when its allies were at first unwilling and later unable to provide any help more substantial than advice." Against the major theme of a foreign policy marked by tragic dilemmas is the complex, volatile pattern of conflict between the Serbs and the Croats, a conflict rooted in history, religion and politics.

With supreme command of his material, and a sense of the swift flow of history, the author traces Yugoslavia's efforts to establish an alliance with France and Great Britain which would guarantee its national security. The vacillation and weakness of the Western Powers in the 1930's in the face of the rise of an aggressive and expansionist Italy and Germany is ably presented.

This first-class study is highly recommended to all students of European history and politics.

A.Z.R.

*(Continued on page 310)*



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## EAST GERMANY

(Continued from page 272)

younger generation has been systematically conditioned to absolute loyalty to the Party, in defiance of the family, the Church and traditional values. The Party's inhuman corruption of youth, imbuing it with hatred of the West and even of its own older generation, constitutes one of the greatest tragedies of our time. Under these circumstances it is surprising that people in East Germany manage to maintain their cultural and moral integrity and their general anti-Ulbricht orientation. They do this by having two sets of values and two masters: their own and the obligatory set.

The absolute unpopularity of the Ulbricht regime is, of course, the reason for its insecurity and, therefore, its Stalinist character. Without the presence of Soviet arms—and there are 22 divisions in Eastern Germany—Ulbricht's rule would collapse tomorrow. This was proved in June, 1953, and things have not essentially changed. Beyond that is the overriding fact of the existence of Western Germany where 54 million fellow Germans live in freedom and prosperity. This fundamental fact will continue to affect developments in Eastern Germany; for this reason Ulbricht's régime, unlike other Communist satellite regimes, cannot be liberal, cannot be national, or Titoistic. To maintain himself in power, Ulbricht must cling to Stalinist control, and as long as he "delivers the goods" to Russia, as he has done despite everything, Khrushchev must give him political, material and moral support.

It would be foolish, however, for the Western powers, out of a false sense of "realism," to boost Ulbricht's posture by extending diplomatic recognition to the German Democratic Republic or to write off reunification because realization is not possible in the foreseeable future. Aside from needlessly discarding diplomatic cards, the Western powers would increase Ulbricht's credit with Moscow. He would really seem indispen-

sable to the Kremlin and his Stalinist methods would have been proved right. The continued failures of the regime in the economic field, as well as its failure to win over the masses, offer a hope for the East Germans. Western powers should not smother their hope by thoughtlessly setting their sign and seal to a *fait accompli* imposed by Soviet arms.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(Continued from page 280)

Naturally, the Communists and the non-Communists differ in their respective expectations of the consequences of such a *détente*. The Communists hope that as a result the *status quo* in East Central Europe—and their personal stakes in it—will be confirmed forever. The non-Communists, on the contrary, hope that as a result of such an American-Soviet "deal" the *status quo* will be altered and some form of neutralization and major relaxation in East Central Europe will follow. Their ideal seems to be the situation in Austria. Realistically, however, both sides, the Communist rulers and the non-Communist majority, expect to be disappointed and brace themselves accordingly for a further period of uneasy coexistence.

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## YUGOSLAVIA

(Continued from page 298)

The Yugoslav chieftain is 71 years old as of May 25, 1963. While neither his demise nor his retirement appear imminent, the question of his successor is perhaps the most absorbing, publicly undiscussed problem in Yugoslav politics. More than the extent of Yugoslavia's solidarity with the Soviet bloc is involved. On the one hand many Yugoslav Communists, especially younger ones, venerate Tito for his accomplishments. But they tend to regard him as a block to the kind of liberalizing direction they think Titoism should logically follow. On the other hand, Tito has qualities of leadership and personal

magnetism not easily replaceable in a dictatorship that tries to base itself on popular approval of ethnic groups (whose past is one of bitter conflict).

The obvious choice for succession lies between the two vice presidents, Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene, and Aleksandar Ranković, a Serb. Neither has the kind of "political it" Tito possesses, and the selection of either could well exacerbate ethnic feeling among the republics.

What is likely to happen, is that Kardelj and Ranković together will succeed Tito, splitting functions as provided in an article of the new constitution written to cope with just this problem. Under this arrangement, Ranković would take over formal direction of the League of Communists and become ceremonial head of the Republic, while Kardelj, keeping a high Party post, would take the reins of the government administration as president of the Federal Executive Council, a new post. Such a division reflects the work of the two men now, operating under Tito's general but increasingly inactive direction. While Ranković is thought to place more emphasis on Communist solidarity than Kardelj, the difference between them thus far has been one of degree only. Actually, the main importance of succession will lie less in the new leadership than in the change itself, overdue after nearly 18 years.

The new constitution, scheduled for adoption this year, apparently recognizes the need for change, but only on levels below Tito. One provision limits the tenure of future Presidents of the Republic to two four-year terms and the tenure of members of parliament to one four-year term. Whether this latter limitation will affect Kardelj and Ranković remains to be seen.

Despite the problems inherent in succession most observers feel that the regime has enough stability to surmount them and that the infighting for power of the Soviet variety is unlikely. At this juncture, to talk about the first succession in a regime like Yugoslavia's is like talking about the pudding before it is even baked, let alone eaten. The proof is yet to come.

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## ALBANIA

*(Continued from page 304)*

tiate, and, in a gesture of amity, the Tirana government permitted the repatriation of Greeks who had been in Albania since the Greek civil war.

Although Hoxha continues to encounter political difficulties at home, he has managed to destroy his opposition and to strengthen his dictatorial powers. Several prominent Communists have been executed and a number of others imprisoned. The election of June 3, 1962, which endorsed the government by a landslide, was officially interpreted as "a victory of people and party" against the imperialists and "modern revisionists" who are plotting against the integrity of Albania. Said Hoxha: "We are ready to protect socialism and to maintain the purity of Marxism-Leninism."

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## BOOK REVIEWS

*(Continued from page 308)*

**WAR AND PEACE AND GERMANY.** By Fred Warner Neal (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1962. 166 pages, appendices and index, \$3.95.)

Here, Fred Warner Neal evaluates critically United States policies toward Berlin and Germany, since World War II.

Pointing out that "there are two main troubles with U.S. policy on Germany," Neal declares that "the first one is that it can't succeed. Its goal of German reunification on Western terms is impossible. . . . And currently it stakes everything on maintaining an unmaintainable status quo in Berlin. The second trouble is that it commits U.S. prestige and U.S. security in defense of an interest not our own. West German relations with East Germany and whether Berlin is an all-German capital are primarily German concerns, not American." Neal proposes a more realistic United States policy based on a "minimum goal" solution for West Berlin" (i.e., not contingent on reunification for Germany) leading to an eventual demilitarization of Central Europe. T.H.B.

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of March, 1963, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Disarmament

March 5—United Nations Secretary General U Thant criticizes the nuclear powers for the deadlocked Geneva disarmament talks, charging they are playing a “game of arithmetic” on the number of on-site inspections of a nuclear test ban treaty.

March 13—The U.S. delegation explains to the Geneva conferees that its offer to reduce on-site inspections to 7 annually is based on a plan to cover 500 square kilometers in each check. The Soviet Union refuses to discuss inspection procedures until the Western powers accept its offer to allow a maximum of 3 on-site inspections a year.

March 15—The United States delegate at Geneva, Charles C. Stelle, declares that a direct communications link between the White House and the Kremlin, a so-called “hot line,” would “immediately reduce the danger of accidental war.”

March 22—The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. admit they cannot agree on an order of procedure for discussing disarmament proposals at the Geneva disarmament conference.

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

March 4—The Common Market’s Executive Commission publishes its detailed report on the negotiations leading to the refusal to allow Britain to join the E.E.C. The report was requested by the European parliament.

March 26—Six finance ministers of the Common Market nations end a 2-day conference.

## United Nations

March 6—U.S. Deputy Representative Francis T. O. Plimpton announces that the U.S. will drastically reduce its payments for U.N. peace-keeping operations unless other U.N. members pay their assessments. The U.S. plans to pay its present assessment of some 32 per cent but unless the U.N.’s collection record improves it will discontinue special voluntary contributions which have raised the total U.S. contribution to some 47.5 per cent for the Congo force and the Middle Eastern force.

March 13—At the 19th annual conference of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (Ecafe), 9 Asian nations present a resolution to schedule a high-level conference of Asian governments “to formulate and adopt more positive measures for regional action” against poverty. The 24-members of Ecafe adopt the resolution unanimously.

## ALGERIA

March 15—Premier Ahmed Ben Bella and Moroccan King Hassan II meet in Algiers. The two leaders issue a communiqué declaring that they have conferred on international problems with “great cordiality.” Hassan departs for Morocco, ending his 3-day visit.

March 19—The Algerian government announces that France conducted an underground test of a nuclear device in the Sahara. A Cabinet communiqué protests the nuclear test.

March 20—Algerian Premier Ahmed Ben Bella in a speech before the National As-

sembly demands that France negotiate a ban on tests in the Sahara.

March 21—Algerian Foreign Minister Mohammed Khemisti presents the French Ambassador to Algeria with a request that nuclear tests in the Sahara be banned and that the Sahara military bases agreement with France be revised.

March 24—A 24-man Algerian mission leaves on a tour of the U.A.R., Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

March 26—The National Assembly approves a \$435 million development program for 1963. It is expected that 90 per cent will be financed by France and other foreign sources.

### BRAZIL

March 10—Brazilian Finance Minister Francisco San Tiago Dantas arrives in Washington for financial negotiations to ease Brazil's serious balance of payments deficit.

March 11—Finance Minister Dantas confers with U.S. President Kennedy.

March 17—The Leftist Parliamentary Nationalist Front announces a meeting within a few days to urge the removal of U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon. The Nationalist Front is protesting Gordon's statement (released in Washington) before a House of Representatives subcommittee, declaring that Communists have infiltrated into the Administration and into President João Goulart's Brazilian Labor party.

March 18—It is reported that President Goulart has instructed the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington to refute charges of Communist infiltration in the government, and to ask for an explanation.

March 25—Finance Minister Dantas and the U.S. Director of the Agency for International Development exchange letters signifying the agreement on a U.S. aid grant to Brazil. The total U.S. commitment for 1963 is \$398,500,000.

It is disclosed that Brazil has rejected passport applications for a Soviet delegation wishing to attend a "Latin American Congress for Solidarity with Cuba," to open in Rio de Janeiro later this week.

March 26—Guanabara State Governor Carlos Lacerda prevents the Solidarity with Cuba Congress from meeting in Rio de Janeiro. State police surround the meeting hall to prevent entry. The delegates convene in Niteroi, the state capital.

## BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

### Canada

March 3—Prime Minister John Diefenbaker charges that the U.S. is a fickle and unreliable ally where weapons are concerned; the prime minister is opening his campaign for re-election.

### Great Britain

March 4—Defense Minister Peter Thorneycroft proposes a unified ministry of defense.

March 5—Minister of Aviation Julian Avery tells Commons that Britain must keep her nuclear deterrent.

March 8—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan declares that Europe "must not be a peevish critic of American strength nor a third force to rival America or challenge its power."

March 13—In a joint communiqué ending two days of talks in London, Great Britain supports the U.S. concept of a mixed-manned nuclear armed fleet.

March 15—The Government's leader of the House, Ian Macleod, supports the suggestion that House of Commons debates should be televised.

March 17—Lord Beveridge, responsible for reports that led to Britain's major post-war social legislation, dies at the age of 84.

March 18—After a conference between German Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel and British Defense Minister Thorneycroft, a joint communiqué endorses the German theory of "forward strategy" for Europe's defense, involving the ready availability of nuclear weapons.

March 19—The *Daily Mirror* reprints a *Times* (London) editorial of March 18 condemning British press censorship.

March 22—In the Colne Valley (Yorkshire)

the Conservative party is defeated in yesterday's by-election.

March 23—Labour party leader Harold Wilson charges that the Government handles information in a way that stifles the press.

March 26—Thousands of unemployed workers demonstrate in Parliament Square.

## India

March 5—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru charges that Communist China is interfering in Indian-Pakistani relations to advance its "own expansionist policy."

March 12—In New Delhi, it is revealed that India has refused a Communist Chinese suggestion to open negotiations on China's terms to end the border dispute. Nehru has declared that China must fully accept the Colombo proposals.

The fourth round of talks on Kashmir opens in Calcutta.

March 14—Indian and Pakistani delegations announce that the fifth round of talks on Kashmir will begin April 21 in Karachi. The fourth round of talks ends tomorrow.

March 18—The Indian government reveals that India has sent a letter of protest to the U.N. against the recent Kashmir border agreement between Communist China and Kashmir.

March 23—Nehru tells Parliament that recent Chinese declarations are in effect a warning that China is contemplating further aggression.

March 26—Peking radio says that China has accused India of fortifying Chinese territory north of the Tibet-Sikkim border.

## Pakistan

(See also *India*, March 12 and 14)

March 12—A Foreign Office spokesman reveals that Pakistani-Chinese negotiations have resulted in the tentative cession to Pakistan of 750 square miles held by China. There will be no territorial loss to Pakistan. The text of the provisional agreement and accompanying maps are published in Karachi.

## BRITISH EMPIRE, THE Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

March 25—At a conference in London with British officials, the Northern Rhodesian delegation leaves the meetings because it is not given the right to secede; Nyasaland has already received permission to leave the Federation if it so wishes.

March 29—The British Government declares that any territories in the Federation may secede.

## Kenya

March 8—British Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys reveals that Britain has agreed to let some 200,000 Somalis in the northern frontier district of Kenya form their own region. Elections for Kenya's first African government will be held May 18 to 26, he announces.

## CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

March 1—*Jen Min Jih Pao* (official Communist party organ) publishes an article accusing the Soviet Union of jamming Peking Radio broadcasts telling the Soviet people the Chinese side of the ideological argument between the two countries. This is the first in a series of 8 articles to defend the Chinese Communist stand.

March 5—It is reported that Chinese forces have completed their promised 3-month long withdrawal along the Indian border. *Jen Min Jih Pao* publishes an editorial stating that India has set impossible conditions for negotiation of the border problem.

March 10—Laotian King Savang Vatthana and other leading Laotian officials end a 4-day visit to Communist China. A joint communiqué is issued declaring that Laos and Communist China have successfully conferred on promoting greater economic cooperation.

*Hsinhua* (Chinese Communist press agency) reports that the Soviet Ambassador



to China has discussed the possibility of a conference to iron out Soviet-Chinese differences with the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party.

### **CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)**

March 3—It is reported that Congolese soldiers have put down a revolt against the Central government in formerly secessionist South Kasai province. However, it is reported that a number of rebels, formerly provincial gendarmes loyal to the ousted Albert Kalonji, are still at large.

March 11—Premier Cyrille Adoula tells a 9-member international commission of economists that his country's economy needs to be overhauled to halt the economic crisis. The commission is studying remedies for the Congo's economic ills.

March 14—In a letter to the United Nations, Premier Cyrille Adoula asks for aid from 6 countries (under U.N. supervision) in reorganizing and streamlining his military troops. The countries are the U.S., Belgium, Italy, Israel, Canada and Norway.

March 15—In the House of Representatives (lower house) the parliamentary opposition wins all 7 seats in the executive body of the House, the Bureau.

March 19—In the Senate, a member of secessionist ex-President Moïse Tshombe's Conakat party submits a draft constitution that would set up a federal system with a weak central government and strong provincial powers. This draft stands in opposition to the proposed constitution drafted by the U.N. and endorsed by Premier Adoula.

March 26—Sources report that the opposition bloc in the legislature has asked Premier Adoula to reorganize his Cabinet to include 16 opposition members.

March 29—Congolese soldiers clash with civilians in Boma. Reports disclose that some 17 have been killed and 80 have been wounded since fighting began on March 26. Premier Adoula asks the U.N. to send observers to the city.

### **CUBA**

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy* and *U.S.S.R.*)

March 12—It is reported that 560 Soviet military personnel left March 9 aboard the *Gruzia*.

March 14—It is reported that last night Premier Fidel Castro told an audience at the University of Havana that "modern arms are passing into our hands." It is believed that the arms come from departing Soviet troops.

March 29—The captain of a U.S. merchant ship announces that 2 Soviet-built MIG's fired on his ship yesterday. The vessel was not hit.

March 30—It is reported that last night Cuba sent a note of apology to the U.S. that the MIG's "probably fired in error," and unintentionally. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

### **DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

March 5—The U.S. announces that it will send over 10,000 tons of food to Dominican farmers. The Dominican farmers are being helped until they can harvest their own crops on land being distributed under an agrarian reform plan.

### **FRANCE**

(See also *Algeria*.)

March 1—Coal miners in the nationalized coal industry strike for an 11 per cent wage increase. The government has proposed a 5.75 per cent increase.

March 2—The government issues a requisition order to striking miners to be at their jobs on Monday, March 4, under penalty of fines and imprisonment.

March 4—It is reported that last night a 5-man Military Court of Justice sentenced 3 men to death for an assassination attempt on the life of President Charles de Gaulle. Three conspirators in flight are sentenced to death in absentia. Six of the conspirators are given prison sentences.

Georges Bidault, head of the anti-de Gaulle Council of National Resistance, in

a taped television interview presented in Britain, declares that he and his group are still working for the overthrow of the French government. Bidault is sought by French authorities.

Striking miners defy the government's order to return to their jobs.

March 7—French miners ignore an appeal by the government to return to work.

March 8—Premier Georges Pompidou in a radio and television interview urges miners to obey the government's orders. He speaks of the country's need for coal.

March 10—Georges Bidault is detained by West German police. He requests political asylum in West Germany. (See also *West Germany*.)

March 11—Jean-Marie Bastien-Thiry is executed for attempting to kill de Gaulle. Two others sentenced to death with him are spared.

Striking miners and police clash when miners attempt to halt buses carrying administrative employees to work.

March 12—The Mona Lisa is returned to the Louvre after a 3-month tour in the U.S.

March 13—The government announces three decisions made at a Cabinet meeting on the coal miners' strike. The government orders a report comparing wages in nationalized and private industries; Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is to be asked to examine the financial situation of nationalized industry; a study is to be made of long-range plans for industrial energy.

March 15—French railway unions begin a 24-hour strike.

March 16—French union leaders and officials of the coal industry hold their first formal talks on settling the coal strike.

President de Gaulle arrives in the Netherlands for a 3-4 hour visit.

March 19—Striking iron miners vote to end their 19-day strike and return to their jobs tomorrow, after government assurances that there will be no unemployment until June 1 at least.

March 20—Gas and electric power workers

stage a 4-hour strike.

March 24—Negotiations between leaders of the coal industry and union officials, begun this morning, are broken off; no date for resumption is set. Yesterday, the government proposed a 7.4 per cent wage increase for miners.

March 26—Bidault flies to Portugal.

March 27—A Portuguese government official announces that Bidault has been informed that he may not remain in Portugal.

## GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

March 1—The Bundesrat (upper house) approves a resolution endorsing the Franco-German treaty signed in January. The resolution contains a qualification that the treaty is not to affect West Germany's alignment with the U.S. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer appears in the Bundesrat to promote support for the pact.

March 4—The Executive Committee of the Christian Democratic party confers on ending the feud between Adenauer and Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard. Adenauer and Erhard shake hands at the meeting's close. The leader of the C.D.U. parliamentary group, Heinrich von Brentano, declares later that the question of Adenauer's succession must be settled.

March 7—Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel announces that U.S. plans for a multi-nation atomic force have been approved by West Germany. Von Hassel states that the mixed crews which will operate the Polaris submarines are also acceptable.

March 11—The opposition Social Democratic party, in a published report, accuses the government of 15 lies in its handling of the Spiegel case in the fall of 1962.

March 12—The parliamentary whip of the Socialist opposition in Parliament resigns following reports that he gave a reporter for *Der Spiegel* a secret document.

A federal prosecutor declares that former French Premier and head of the anti-de Gaulle Council of National Resistance

Georges Bidault has been found free of suspicion of criminal conspiracy and may go anywhere in West Germany. A West German government spokesman declares that Bidault will receive political asylum if he ends his political activities.

March 15—The Cabinet decides to bar the export of 163,000 tons of steel pipe ordered by the Soviet Union from West German manufacturers in October, 1962. Following a U.S. request for an embargo on such exports by its Nato allies, the West German government in December issued a decree that the steel exporters would need a special permit. The parliamentary opposition states that German firms should deliver goods on contracts signed before the embargo became effective. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

March 18—A special session of parliament is convened at the request of the Social Democratic party on the issue of German steel pipe exports to the Soviet Union. The 242 Christian Democratic members of parliament boycott the session, leaving it without a quorum, to avoid a defeat for Adenauer.

## GUATEMALA

March 30—The government of President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes is overthrown by a rightist anti-Fidelista rebel group. The coup was engineered by Defense Minister Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia. Peralta suspends the constitution and dissolves the legislature.

March 31—Ydigoras leaves for Nicaragua.

## HUNGARY

March 22—Premier Janos Kádár decrees a political amnesty for political prisoners, including those jailed after the 1956 revolution.

## IRAQ

(See also *Syria* and *U.A.R.*)

March 2—It is reported that the Iraq Revolutionary Council broadcast a statement last night guaranteeing "the rights of Kurds." The announcement followed the departure of the Kurdish emissary, Jela Talabani,

to report to the leader of the Kurdish rebellion, General Mustafa Barzani. Barzani has threatened to go to war again if the new government does not honor its promise to grant Kurdish autonomy.

## ISRAEL

March 20—Foreign Minister Golda Meir reads a statement to the Knesset (Parliament) asking West Germany to prohibit German scientists from helping the U.A.R. "to develop offensive missiles . . . and even armaments banned by international law . . ." The Knesset seconds the government statement. The statement is believed to be in response to the arrest last week in Switzerland of 2 Israeli spies, accused of trying to force German scientists to end their work for Egypt.

March 22—The West German Ministry of Justice asks Switzerland to extradite the 2 Israeli spies for trying to murder a German rocket scientist who worked for the U.A.R.

A U.A.R. statement admits West German scientists are cooperating in scientific and technological research.

March 31—Premier David Ben-Gurion announces that the chief of Israel's security forces (his identity is not revealed) has resigned in the controversy over German scientists working for the U.A.R.

## JORDAN

March 28—It is reported that King Hussein of Jordan has removed Premier Wasfi Tel; his successor is Samir Rifai. It is also disclosed that many persons have been arrested in Hussein's efforts to prevent a Nasserite or Baathist revolt.

## KOREA, SOUTH

March 16—General Chung Hee Park (leader of the ruling military junta) withdraws his promise for elections for a new government in the summer. He states that 4 more years of military government are necessary.

March 22—Some 600 marchers demonstrate in Seoul; they demand elections.

March 26—It is reported that the military

junta has offered to compromise with civilian politicians. The junta asks civilian leaders to consent to a civilian-military coalition to govern for two years; after that period, elections will be held. It is revealed that civilian politicians have refused the compromise.

## **PHILIPPINES, THE**

March 9—Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal asks Malayan Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak to urge that the deadline of August 31 for the federation of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo (Malaysia) be dropped. The Philippines claim sovereignty over North Borneo.

## **POLAND**

March 1—It is announced that East Germany and Poland have signed a trade agreement providing for an 11 per cent increase in trade.

March 7—Poland and West Germany sign a 3-year trade agreement, terminating December, 1966. Under the pact West Germany will establish a commercial mission in Poland.

## **PORTUGAL**

March 1—A series of laws on Portuguese territories becomes effective. The new laws will integrate Portuguese territories in Africa and Asia and metropolitan Portugal into an economic bloc with a freely exchangeable escudo (monetary unit).

## **SYRIA**

March 8—The Syrian government is overthrown by a group of pro-Nasser and Baath party followers. In Damascus the National Command of the Revolution broadcasts a message that the "situation is under control."

The U.A.R. and Iraq governments threaten war if anyone interferes in the Syrian revolt.

March 9—The list of the new 20-man

Cabinet is announced. Salah el-Bitar, a Baath party leader, is prime minister. It is noted that there have been no reports on ousted President Nazem el-Kudsi.

It is reported that Lieutenant General Louai Attassi is head of the National Council of Revolution Command. (Attassi was just released from prison by the rebels.)

March 10—In Damascus, Vice Premier Ali Saleh Saadi of Iraq suggests a multilateral military agreement to include Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Algeria. Saadi heads a delegation to present his government's greetings.

March 12—Premier el-Bitar declares that he hopes for a federation of Syria, Egypt and Iraq under one president.

## **U.S.S.R., THE**

March 7—A closed meeting attended by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet officials, and leading intellectuals is held in the Kremlin's Sverdlov Hall.

March 8—Soviet sources report that Premier Khrushchev has told Soviet artists and writers, at the second day of meetings in the Kremlin, that open rebellion against socialist realism in the arts will not be tolerated.

Tass (official Soviet Press Agency) announces that Agriculture Minister Konstantin G. Pysin has been dismissed. He will be "transferred to other duties." He is succeeded by Ivan P. Volovchenko.

March 9—The Soviet government announces that Chairman of the State Committee of Chemical Industry Viktor S. Fedorov has been replaced by Nikolai K. Baibakov.

March 11—It is announced by the Soviet government that it agrees with the Chinese Communist government that a meeting to iron out ideological differences is necessary.

March 13—The Soviet government protests to the U.S. that American ships fired on a Soviet fishing vessel 70 miles off Norfolk, Virginia.

At a joint meeting, the Presidium and Council of Ministers agree on drastic economic reforms. The present 7-year plan

will be replaced by a new 5-year plan (1966–1970). A Supreme Council of National Economy will be created to coordinate national economic planning for industry and construction. Dmitri F. Ustinov is named chairman of the Council.

March 23—Tass announces that Aleksei V. Romanov has been appointed chairman of the State Committee on Cinematography, a new post with Cabinet rank. He will have control over the motion picture industry.

The U.S. State Department issues a statement denying responsibility for the refusal of other countries to sell pipeline equipment to Russia. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*, and *West Germany*). The U.S. is replying to a Soviet protest against such an embargo.

March 27—In a note to the U.S. government (made public by Tass), the Soviet Union declares that it holds the U.S. responsible for an attack on the Russian freighter *Lvov* staged by Cuban exiles from a launch on March 17. The ship was in a port on the north coast of Cuba.

March 28—*Krasnaya Zvezda* (army newspaper) announces that Marshal Sergei S. Biryuzov (commander of Soviet strategic rockets) has been named Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. He replaces Marshal Matvei V. Zakharov.

March 29—The Soviet Union asks the U.S. for compensation for damages to the Soviet ship *Baku*, attacked by Cuban rebels on March 26.

March 30—The U.S. State and Justice Departments issue an announcement stating that investigation into the 2 attacks this month shows that they were not launched from the U.S. (See above, March 27–29 and also *U.S. Foreign Policy*).

## UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

March 14—An official 8-man Syrian delegation arrives in Cairo for talks with the U.A.R. and Iraq on military cooperation.

March 17—Delegations from Syria and Iraq to the U.A.R. return home for consulta-

tions. The three governments are conferring on a federation. A statement from Egyptian President Nasser's office declares that a "definite agreement of views" has been reached.

March 19—Syrian Premier Salah el-Bitar, Secretary General of the Baath party Michel Aflak, and Commander in Chief of the Syrian Army Lieutenant General el-Attassi arrive in Cairo, and meet with Nasser.

March 21—A joint communiqué is issued at the conclusion of talks between el-Bitar and U.A.R. officials; it states that Syrians and Egyptians have conferred on the creation of "an equal federal union."

## UNITED STATES

### Agriculture

March 14—The Department of Agriculture raises price supports on milk, butter and cheese. Support prices are at the lowest level permitted by law, 75 per cent of parity.

### Civil Rights

March 5—In Greenwood, Mississippi, the shooting of a Negro voter registration worker is followed by the arrest of 2 well-known local white men.

March 27—Builder William Levitt refuses to sell homes in his Mowie, Maryland, project to Negroes in defiance of the President's anti-discrimination housing order.

March 30—The Department of Justice files suit to prevent interference with Negro voter registration in Greenwood, Mississippi.

### Foreign Policy

March 6—The President tells a press conference that the U.S. will not agree to a nuclear test ban that does not give "every assurance that we could detect a series of tests underground" in the U.S.S.R.

March 8—Secretary of State Dean Rusk says chances of a three-power test ban treaty are "not good." (See also *International Disarmament*.)



March 13—George C. McGhee is named Ambassador to Germany; Roger Hilsman is named Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.

March 16—The U.S. protests to the U.S.S.R. against 2 Soviet reconnaissance aircraft flights over Alaska March 15.

March 19—After 2 days of discussion in San Jose, Costa Rica, President Kennedy and the presidents of the 6 Central American states sign a declaration pledging the strengthening of efforts to stop Soviet aggression.

March 20—At the end of a 3-day visit in Costa Rica, President Kennedy says the U.S. cannot accept a "yielding up" of Cuban sovereignty to the U.S.S.R.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union agree on a joint program for launching weather satellites.

March 21—President Kennedy reports on his 3-day meeting in Costa Rica with Central American officials.

March 23—The Committee for Strengthening the Security of the Free World, a top-level study group named by the President to study foreign aid, reports that although foreign aid is necessary, "we are attempting too much for too many." The 9-member panel was named in December, 1962.

March 25—The U.S. reveals that American and Soviet scientists have agreed to set up a teletype and facsimile direct communication link on a permanent basis between Moscow and Washington. Weather information will be exchanged via this underseas cable and radio connection.

March 27—Assistant Secretary of State George Ball arrives in London reportedly to discuss the United States request that Britain refuse to sell steel pipeline to the U.S.S.R. for Russian transport of oil from the Volga to Central Europe. The West German contract to sell the pipe to the U.S.S.R. was allegedly dropped after a secret decision of Nato (Nov. 21, 1962) that members of the alliance should not furnish the pipe to the Soviet Union. (See also *West Germany*.)

King Hassan II of Morocco arrives in Washington for a 2-day state visit.

March 28—The State Department reports that unidentified jet fighters fired shots at an American ship north of Cuba. (See also *Cuba*.)

March 29—President Kennedy reaffirms the U.S. pledge to withdraw military forces from 4 Moroccan bases by the end of 1963.

March 30—The Departments of State and Justice announce jointly that the U.S. will "take every step necessary" to see that United States territory is not used as a base for Cuban refugee raids on Cuba or on Soviet shipping.

March 31—Travel restrictions are placed on 18 Cuban refugees in the Miami area.

## Government

March 9—The Civil Aeronautics Board reveals it has voted 4-1 to defer action on the proposed merger of Pan American World Airways and Trans World Airlines.

March 11—The Labor Department issues its first annual comprehensive manpower report required by the manpower development and training act of 1962; the President tells Congress that the nation's number one economic problem is unemployment.

March 19—Leland J. Haworth is named director of the National Science Foundation, replacing retiring Alan T. Waterman.

March 28—Billy Sol Estes is convicted on 4 counts of mail fraud and one of conspiracy; the mail fraud charges involve the sale of mortgages on non-existent fertilizer tanks to finance companies.

## Labor

March 14—The Brotherhood of Railway Clerks and the Southern Pacific Railroad accept President Kennedy's proposal to arbitrate the unsettled issues of their contract dispute.

March 23—New York's striking newspaper printers accept a new contract providing a \$12.63 a man a week salary and fringe benefit increase; the photo-engravers refuse to come to terms with the publishers.

March 31—The 114-day newspaper strike in New York ends as the photo-engravers approve a new contract. This contract also accepts the \$12.63 a man weekly salary and fringe benefit increase. The strike is estimated to have cost between \$190 million and \$250 million. Newspaper prices will be raised.

The 23-day newspaper strike in Cleveland ends. Contract terms are not revealed.

## **Military**

March 3—The Department of Defense releases an explanation of its award for a contract to produce the TFX fighter plane.

March 28—Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara tells the Defense Procurement Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee that criticism of his economic policies stems from "ignorance." McNamara is giving his first public testimony in the dispute over the award of the TFX contract to the General Dynamics Corporation; the Boeing Company was favored by the military Source Selection Board.

March 30—The Department of Defense reveals that a U.S. submarine armed with Polaris missiles has taken up patrol duty in the Mediterranean area.

## **Politics**

March 9—Former Vice-President Richard Nixon charges that the Kennedy administration has not taken sufficiently decisive steps to eliminate "the Communist cancer" in Cuba.

## **Segregation**

March 6—Albany, Georgia's City Commissioners vote 6 to 1 to revoke all segregation ordinances; individual citizens are now responsible for decisions on segregation or integration, according to a spokesman for the commissioners.

March 25—The University of Alabama rejects 2 Negro applicants on the basis of technicalities.

## **Supreme Court**

March 4—The Court upholds a Court of

Appeals decision that railroad management has a right to make major changes in work rules to eliminate unnecessary jobs.

March 18—The Court rules unanimously that states must provide free lawyers to poor defendants facing serious criminal charges. This decision reverses the 1942 decision in the case of *Betts v. Brady*. Other decisions also strengthen the legal protection of criminal defendants in state courts.

Voting 8 to 1, the Court rules that the Georgia county unit system which gives extra weight to rural voters in state-wide elections is unconstitutional.

March 25—The Court rules 5 to 4 that state legislative investigators must have some real evidence of subversive influence in a group before questioning a legitimate organization about possible Communist infiltration.

## **URUGUAY**

March 1—The new government takes office. The Blancos (the more Conservative of the two big Uruguayan parties) won the latest national election. Daniel Fernandez Crespo becomes president of the executive body, a 9-man National Council.

## **VIETNAM, SOUTH**

March 9—A U.S. Defense Department spokesman refutes Soviet accusations that the U.S. is using poison gas in South Vietnam.

## **YEMEN**

March 2—Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, U.N. representative to the Middle East, arrives in Yemen. Danger of conflict is reported between U.A.R. troops in Yemen supporting the revolution and Saudi Arabian forces fighting to help the royalists.

March 5—Bunche arrives in Egypt to discuss the threat of civil war in Yemen.

March 7—It is reported that in a message to Nasser last week the U.S. warned him against bombings on Saudi Arabian soil.

March 8—Official sources in Washington report that Nasser has promised to end attacks against Saudi Arabia while the U.N. attempts a settlement of the Yemeni crisis.

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